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CRIMINAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Avlana K. Eisenberg*
This Article identifies and critiques a trend to criminalize the infliction of
emotional harm independent of any physical injury or threat. The Article defines a new category of criminal infliction of emotional distress (“CIED”)
statutes, which include laws designed to combat behaviors such as harassing,
stalking, and bullying. In contrast to tort liability for emotional harm, which
is cabined by statutes and the common law, CIED statutes allow states to
regulate and punish the infliction of emotional harm in an increasingly expansive way.
In assessing harm and devising punishment, the law has always taken nonphysical harm seriously, but traditionally it has only implicitly accounted for
emotional harm; it has not made emotional harm an element of criminal
liability. CIED statutes represent a break in this narrative. The Article uses
these statutes as an entry point to examine the role that victim emotion does
and should play in substantive criminal law, and it finds that CIED statutes
may endanger free expression and equality and provide insufficient notice to
defendants. These statutes thus offer a cautionary tale, illustrating problems
that can arise when victim emotion plays an explicit role in criminal culpability. CIED statutes also reveal the comparative benefits of the implicit approach, which acknowledges the significance of nonphysical harm yet does not
predicate criminal liability on the existence of emotional harm.
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Introduction
In Florida, two middle school–age girls1 were recently charged with aggravated stalking, a felony; their Facebook messages allegedly caused a classmate to suffer emotional distress that led to her suicide.2 In Montana,
Roman McCarthy received a five-year sentence after mailing two letters to
his ex-wife, neither of which she opened but which nonetheless caused her
emotional distress.3 In Louisiana, Timothy Ryan was convicted of stalking
1. Both teens were named by the authorities, but this Article follows the lead of various
news sources in refraining from publishing the names of juveniles charged with crimes. See
Steve Almasy et al., Sheriff: Taunting Post Leads to Arrests in Rebecca Sedwick Bullying Death,
CNN (Oct. 16, 2013, 8:53 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/15/justice/rebecca-sedwick-bully
ing-death-arrests/.
2. Id.
3. State v. McCarthy, 980 P.2d 629 (Mont. 1999).
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for driving back and forth in front of the Wrights’ house several times over
the course of a day while he was looking for someone else, a pattern of
behavior that caused Mrs. Wright emotional distress.4
Each of these cases involved a criminal statute that imposes liability for
causing another person emotional harm. They are part of a growing trend;
in recent years, thirty states and the District of Columbia have criminalized
the infliction of emotional harm independent of any physical harm or threat
of physical injury.5 These laws, which I term criminal infliction of emotional
distress (“CIED”) statutes, are designed to combat antisocial behaviors such
as harassment, stalking, and bullying. Emotional harm is an element of all
CIED statutes. Yet the statutes range considerably in both the actions they
prohibit and the defendant’s required mental state.6 For example, some require proving that the emotional harm was intentional, but others do not.
Some enumerate prohibited acts, while others include a catchall phrase—
like “repeated unwanted communication”7—without further specification.
In one sense, these laws are unsurprising: emotional harm should beget
criminal liability under the three main theories of criminal punishment.
Utilitarian theory is premised on maximizing welfare; indeed, one reason
why limiting physical harm is of high social value is because of its emotional
consequences. Under a retributive theory, morally blameworthy conduct
should be punished, and knowingly or recklessly inflicting emotional harm
on another person is morally blameworthy. An expressive theory prioritizes
communicating solidarity with victims and rectifying a moral imbalance,
which would support taking emotional harm seriously and standing by victims of emotional abuse.
Since none of these theoretical arguments for criminalizing emotional
harm necessarily requires the existence of related physical harm, we might
expect that substantive criminal law would recognize emotional harm as no
less legitimate than physical harm. Yet traditionally there is no criminal culpability for emotional distress absent physical injury or threat of physical
harm.8 CIED statutes depart from this norm.
This Article uses CIED statutes as an entry point to examine what role
victim emotion does and should play in substantive criminal law. It asks
several questions: Why has it been so rare in the past to explicitly criminalize
infliction of emotional harm (other than fear of physical harm)? In other
words, why have we not always embraced CIED laws? Furthermore, should
we view CIED statutes as a positive step in realigning criminal law doctrine
4. State v. Ryan, 969 So. 2d 1268 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (overturning conviction).
5. For a comprehensive list of criminal infliction of emotional distress statutes and their
key features, see infra Appendix.
6. See infra Appendix.
7. E.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.090.1(5) (Supp. 2013).
8. See, e.g., Youngjae Lee, What Is Philosophy of Criminal Law?, 8 Crim. L. & Phil. 671
(2014) (distinguishing “emotional cruelty” as among those harms that are not subject to criminal liability).
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with theories of punishment, or are they a troublesome break in the criminal law narrative? Ultimately, this Article argues that criminal laws have always acknowledged the importance of victim emotion, even though such
laws traditionally avoid explicitly including emotional harm as a result element. I refer to this paradigm as the implicit approach. Indeed, substantive
criminal law has always assumed that certain kinds of physical violence are
more emotionally traumatic for victims than others. For example, consider
why the punishment for rape is more serious than that for other forms of
assault that may cause more physical damage.9 The special seriousness of
rape comes, at least in part, from its emotional consequences. Yet convicting
a defendant on a rape charge does not require an inquiry into whether a
victim of rape actually experienced emotional harm.
Laws have tended not to criminalize emotional harm explicitly, through
emotional-harm elements, because doing so contravenes several core substantive criminal law design considerations. First, emotional distress is difficult to define—and predict—in a way that would provide adequate notice to
criminal defendants.10 Second, criminalizing the infliction of emotional distress conflicts with free-expression values and a strongly maintained distinction between speech and conduct.11 Indeed, central to the First
Amendment–protected “marketplace of ideas” is the notion that one need
not worry about hurting the feelings of others. Third, lack of social consensus may undermine CIED laws because of sharp cultural disagreement about
the types of conduct that emotionally distress a reasonable person. Finally,
criminalizing emotional harm exacerbates existing concerns about disparate
enforcement and stereotyping by criminal justice actors. The implicit approach traditionally taken by the criminal law therefore represents a careful
compromise, if not necessarily a conscious one: it indirectly addresses emotionally harmful conduct while being fair to defendants and preserving the
social consensus that supports criminal law.
Against this backdrop, the Article examines and critiques CIED statutes.
First, it finds that, in contrast to the implicit approach, CIED statutes fail to
provide adequate notice to defendants because of the imprecise definition of
prohibited acts as well as the unpredictability of emotional harm. It further
raises concerns about institutional competence, challenging the claim that
criminal justice actors, such as prosecutors and police, can be relied on to
prevent the overreach of CIED laws. Concerns about overreach of these
broad CIED statutes may be especially stark in the juvenile context, as these
statutes risk prematurely subjecting juveniles to the criminal justice system.12
9. See infra Section I.B.
10. See infra Section IV.A.
11. See infra Section IV.B.
12. To be sure, the movements to protect victims of stalking and bullying address critical
interests. For example, bullying is a real problem, largely because of the emotional harm it
causes. And yet in the juvenile-peer-bullying context, laws that are supposed to protect
juveniles may also end up harming them by subjecting them unnecessarily to the criminal
justice system. Furthermore, when the theory behind a bullying charge is that the defendant’s
behavior caused emotional distress that led to the victim’s suicide, proving causation presents
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Second, the use of CIED statutes raises serious concerns about stifling
expression. In the CIED context, there is no imminent threat of civil disorder or other serious harm, and these statutes therefore run the risk of chilling and even punishing protected speech. And strong empirical support is
lacking for the justification that these laws are necessary as a prophylactic
measure to prevent future physical harm.
Third, CIED statutes do not grow out of social consensus, and the criminal justice system is ill-equipped to deal with the nuances of CIED cases.
Communications between former intimates are highly personalized, and, in
this often-fraught context, differentiating among welcome, annoying, and
harassing communications may prove exceptionally difficult.13 For example,
even if two unopened letters from a man to his ex-wife constitute a serious
harm, is the legal process competent to determine whether that harm is
criminal? These cases depend on nuanced interpersonal dynamics, a realm
that the criminal law is especially unprepared to regulate.14
Fourth, the use of CIED statutes also risks exacerbating stereotypes; for
example, the stalking case involving Timothy Ryan, mentioned above, reinforces the perception that women are so fragile that they would reasonably
be emotionally distressed by the sight of a car driving down their block a few
times over the course of the day. And criminal justice actors—such as police,
prosecutors, and judges—are not always immune from such stereotyping.
Thus, relying on their discretion to weed out all but the most egregious
CIED cases may not counterbalance the breadth of the statutory text. In
Ryan’s case, the trial judge explained that, “when I consider all the facts[,] I
do believe that there was emotional distress on the part of the victims and
that’s reasonable to understand because, as I’ve stated before, the suspicious
conduct in a neighborhood causes a certain amount of—degree of emotional distress especially with the womenfolk.”15
CIED statutes thus offer a cautionary tale. They illuminate problems
that arise when the criminal law abandons its traditional, implicit approach
a formidable challenge. For example, it may be impossible to prove that a defendant’s offensive
Facebook messages caused a young person’s suicide if that person had a history of emotional
instability and self-abuse that predated the defendant’s conduct. Indeed, the investigation into
the teenager’s suicide in the aforementioned Florida case revealed that she was “a fragile girl
who had a troubled home life, had been cutting herself and was ordered to go to a psychiatric
facility to get help.” Lizette Alvarez, Charges Dropped in Florida Cyberbullying Death, but Sheriff Isn’t Backing Down, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 2013, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/2013/11/22/us/charges-dropped-against-florida-girls-accused-in-cyberbullying-death
.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
13. This scenario also implicates the concerns expressed above about a lack of sufficient
notice to defendants.
14. Cf. John C.P. Goldberg & Robert H. Sitkoff, Torts and Estates: Remedying Wrongful
Interference with Inheritance, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 335 (2013) (critiquing the tort of interference
with inheritance along similar lines). There is no reason to suspect that the criminal law would
handle such interpersonal subtleties any better, and concerns about prosecutorial discretion
and disparate enforcement suggest that inviting the criminal law to deal with such cases may
be even more precarious in the criminal law context. See infra Section IV.A.
15. State v. Ryan, 969 So. 2d 1268, 1271 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (alteration in original).
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to victim emotion. Indeed, CIED statutes make criminal law’s traditional
compromise appear prudent, even if not always perfectly calibrated.16
This Article provides the first sustained examination of the role of victim emotion in the criminal law.17 The dominant strain of criminal law
scholarship that addresses emotions focuses on the role of defendant emotion,18 especially as pertaining to the murder/manslaughter distinction,19 and
the role of emotion in a defendant’s punishment.20 Meanwhile, the question
of how victim emotion impacts substantive criminal law has been largely
ignored.21 This Article fills that gap in the literature by exploring the set of
16. While some may dispute how much weight the implicit approach gives emotional
harm, this is a question of degree and could be altered without fundamentally changing the
way the criminal law assesses culpability.
17. Previous scholarship on emotions and the criminal law focuses on two main topics.
First, the role of defendant emotion as a mitigating factor in criminal punishment. See, e.g.,
Joshua Dressler, Provocation: Partial Justification or Partial Excuse?, 51 Mod. L. Rev. 467
(1988); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law,
96 Colum. L. Rev. 269, 270 (1996); Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform
and the Provocation Defense, 106 Yale L.J. 1331 (1997). Second, the role of victim impact
statements during sentencing. See, e.g., Susan A. Bandes, Victims, “Closure,” and the Sociology
of Emotion, 72 Law & Contemp. Probs. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Bandes, Victims]; Susan Bandes,
Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 361 (1996) [hereinafter
Bandes, Empathy]; Edna Erez, Victim Voice, Impact Statements and Sentencing: Integrating Restorative Justice and Therapeutic Jurisprudence Principles in Adversarial Proceedings, 40 Crim. L.
Bull. 483 (2004). Another strain of scholarship examines victim characteristics as they relate
to vulnerable victim statutes and hate crime laws. This scholarship focuses on objective, statusoriented characteristics, such as age, disability, and homelessness, rather than on victim emotion, which is less objective and could not be considered as akin to a status. See, e.g., Joshua
Kleinfeld, A Theory of Criminal Victimization, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 1087 (2013) (suggesting that
states adopt the Federal Sentencing Guidelines’s “Vulnerable Victim” provision, which increases an offender’s sentence where the defendant knowingly preyed on vulnerable populations such as children, the elderly, or the disabled); Frederick M. Lawrence, The Evolving
Federal Role in Bias Crime Law Enforcement and the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, 19
Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 251, 255 (2008); Jay Dyckman, Note, Brightening the Line: Properly
Identifying a Vulnerable Victim for Purposes of Section 3A1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1960 (1998); Katherine B. O’Keefe, Note, Protecting the Homeless
Under Vulnerable Victim Sentencing Guidelines: An Alternative to Inclusion in Hate Crime Laws,
52 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 301 (2010).
18. See, e.g., Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 17.
19. See, e.g., Dressler, supra note 17; Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 421 (1982); Nourse, supra note
17.
20. See, e.g., Terry A. Maroney, Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging
Field, 30 Law & Hum. Behav. 119, 129–30 (2006) (outlining the contours of the “legal doctrine” category and the limited scholarship to date in this area and concluding that it should
be “an exciting area to watch”); see also Betsy J. Grey, Neuroscience, PTSD, and Sentencing
Mitigation, 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 53 (2012) (describing and assessing sentencing mitigation for
PTSD and other mental disorders).
21. By way of example, The Passions of Law, an anthology dedicated to moving emotion
into the purview of legal analysis, refers to victims in only two contexts. See The Passions of
Law (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999). The first context is victim impact statements. Id. at 178, 189,
218, 325–27. The second context is the victim’s role in punishment—namely, a discussion
about the role of the public prosecutor that contrasts English common law, where victims can
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legal doctrines that explicitly categorizes emotional injury as criminal harm
and by contextualizing CIED statutes within the theoretical foundations of
substantive criminal law. The Article also reframes existing scholarship on
law and emotions,22 drawing a distinction between the implicit and explicit
ways that the criminal law can consider emotional harm.23
Part I introduces the traditional, implicit approach, which carves out a
role for victim emotion in the criminal law without explicitly mentioning
emotional harm as the required result of the defendant’s conduct. Part II
identifies two legal developments outside the confines of substantive criminal law that preceded the first CIED statutes. These developments brought
victim emotion into the foreground in narrowly circumscribed contexts.
This Part first highlights the role of the victims’ rights movement in making
victim emotion an explicit consideration in criminal sentencing, most notably through the introduction of victim impact statements. It then examines
precursor doctrines in civil law—the emotional distress torts—and draws
attention to their limiting principles.
Part III identifies CIED statutes as a category of laws that explicitly
criminalizes the infliction of emotional harm by including emotional distress as the result element. This Part outlines the elements of CIED statutes,
explores the leading justifications for these laws, and highlights their expansive tendencies, which contrast starkly with the limiting principles of the
emotional distress torts. Part IV critiques CIED laws by identifying tensions
between these statutes and core values such as notice to defendants, free
expression, social consensus, and equality.
Part V assesses possible statutory reforms, including prohibiting specific
conduct that predictably causes emotional harm and revising CIED laws to
bring them more in line with the emotional distress torts. This Part also
explores the broader implications of this analysis for the role of victim emotion in criminal law. The Article argues that CIED statutes forgo the implicit
approach that criminal law traditionally uses when accounting for victim
emotion and that, ultimately, the blunt tool of the criminal law is not well
suited for addressing emotional harm that is independent of physical injury
still prosecute cases, with the American system, where the state has assumed the role of prosecutor. Id. at 204–05.
22. This body of scholarship includes work by legal academics in the diverse areas of
family law, criminal law, and tort law, among other disciplines. See, e.g., The Passions of
Law, supra note 21; Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Who’s Afraid of Law and the Emotions?, 94
Minn. L. Rev. 1997 (2010); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of
Affective Forecasting, 80 Ind. L.J. 155 (2005); Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89 Geo.
L.J. 1977 (2001); Carol Sanger, Essay, The Role and Reality of Emotions in Law, 8 Wm. & Mary
J. Women & L. 107 (2001). Notably, outside the context of the provocation doctrine, surprisingly little scholarship addresses the literal overlap between law and emotions, that is, when
the substantive law explicitly is called upon to assess human emotion.
23. Some scholars critique the law for a “tendency to dichotomize and hierarchize reason
and emotion,” and they argue that emotions should play a more explicit role. E.g., Abrams &
Keren, supra note 22, at 2002. By identifying the implicit approach to victim emotion and
highlighting its advantages, the Article challenges this view and offers a competing framework
for future analysis.
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or threat of physical harm. Instead, criminal law should strongly prefer the
traditional, implicit approach to victim emotion.
I. The Traditional Implicit Approach to Victim Emotion
in Criminal Law
A. Emotional Harm and Punishment Theory
Each of the three main theories of punishment—utilitarian, retributive,
and expressive24—supports treating emotional harm as cognizable in criminal law, independent of physical harm.25 Furthermore, none of these theories requires that the emotional harm in question is fear of physical injury or
that it is in any other way connected to physical harm.
Under a utilitarian theory, which is premised on maximizing welfare
and minimizing unhappiness, emotional harm is not only cognizable, but
physical harm is important precisely because of its emotional consequences.26
A central tenet of utilitarianism is that “the moral worth of an action (or of
a practice, institution, law, etc.) is to be judged by its effect in promoting
happiness.”27 Therefore, punishment is appropriate when happiness has
been compromised, because the state’s goal is to maximize the welfare of its
citizens.
Under a retributive theory, morally blameworthy conduct should be
punished,28 and knowingly or recklessly inflicting emotional harm on another person constitutes such conduct. According to the retributivist,

24. Some scholars include expressivism as a subcategory of retribution. E.g., Carissa
Byrne Hessick, Motive’s Role in Criminal Punishment, 80 S. Cal. L. Rev. 89, 113 (2006). I
separate it out here for analytical purposes and have suggested elsewhere that it is closely
related both to retributivism and to utilitarianism. E.g., Avlana Eisenberg, Expressive Enforcement, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 858, 878–80 (2014).
25. There is substantial debate about what constitutes an emotion and to what extent
emotion is related to cognition, but that discussion is beyond the scope of this Article. Laura E.
Little, Negotiating the Tangle of Law and Emotion, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 974, 982 (2001) (reviewing The Passions of Law) (describing three primary theoretical approaches to discerning
what constitutes an emotion: Freudian, evolutionary, and social constructionist); see also Jon
Elster, Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions 443 (1999) (listing fortyfour separate emotions). The Article’s focus on emotional harm, however, is not intended to
reach nonemotional mental states such as impaired cognition.
26. Notably, recent psychological research on affective forecasting has cast doubt on
whether individuals are able to predict how, and to what extent, future events will affect their
emotional well-being. See, e.g., Blumenthal, supra note 22, at 158–59. But one can still assume
that physical harm would in many instances result in reduced happiness, even if not as drastically or with as far-reaching long-term consequences as one might expect.
27. Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. Legal Stud. 103,
104 (1979) (distinguishing utilitarianism, which focuses on maximizing happiness, from the
economic norm of “wealth maximization”).
28. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Probs. 401,
412 (1958).
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“Crime inflicts an injury on victims and communities, and, as a consequence, offenders deserve to suffer in proportion to their blameworthiness.”29 Retributivists may disagree about how best to assess emotional harm
in determining proportional penalties, but, as a foundational matter, emotional harm is cognizable harm.30
Finally, expressive theory prioritizes rectifying a moral imbalance by expressing solidarity with victims.31 According to expressive theory, punishment is “a conventional device for the expression of attitudes of resentment
and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation.”32 Expressing indignation at the harm suffered by a victim necessarily includes
taking seriously the victim’s emotional abuse as well as any physical harm.
Punishment may also serve an expressive function by effectuating “the repair
of the material and emotional harms that criminal behavior inflicts.”33
While emotional distress, independent of physical harm, is cognizable
under the main theories of criminal punishment, in practice it has not been
punished. The next Section explores why, delving into the criminal law’s
traditional treatment of victim emotion.
B. Emotional Harm and Crime Definition
Victim emotion has always been relevant to criminal punishment. A
traditional account of the injury associated with a particular crime includes,
in addition to physical harm, an implicit assessment of the victim’s emotional harm. Substantive criminal law has always assumed that victims experience certain kinds of physical violence as more emotionally traumatic than
others, and it has scaled punishments accordingly. For example, this assumption helps to explain the heightened punishment for rape as compared
to the punishment for other forms of assault that may cause more physical
damage.34 Consider also the difference between punishments for larceny and
29. Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of Restorative
Justice, 2003 Utah L. Rev. 205, 219.
30. For a related critique of retributivism based on concerns about rank-ordering crimes,
see David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1623, 1636–42 (1992).
31. For a general discussion of expressive theory and how laws have been said to send
messages, see, for example, Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 943 (1995); Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 Or. L.
Rev. 339 (2000); and Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev.
2021 (1996). For a critique of expressive theory, see, for example, Robert Weisberg, Norms and
Criminal Law, and the Norms of Criminal Law Scholarship, 93 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 467
(2003).
32. Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in Doing & Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility 95, 98 (1970); Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 17, at
352.
33. Laura I. Appleman, Retributive Justice and Hidden Sentencing, 68 Ohio St. L.J. 1307,
1337 (2007) (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
34. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597–98 (1977) (acknowledging the “mental and psychological damage” of rape, in addition to any physical injury); Susan Estrich, Real Rape
103–04 (1987) (recognizing that rape is “a violation of the most personal, most intimate, and
most offensive kind”). Historically, rape was also considered more serious than assault in part
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for the more serious robbery and burglary. Robbery is larceny plus the use
or threat of force, which the law assumes to have a greater emotional impact
on the victim (even though it may have no greater physical impact, assuming that the threat is not carried out).35 Burglary traditionally involved
breaking and entering a dwelling at night, which was also believed to result
in heightened emotional consequences.36
But, historically, victims’ emotions have largely been considered in the
abstract; if a particular crime has been deemed to cause severe emotional
harm, it is punished with extra seriousness but requires no specific inquiry
into the harm suffered by a particular victim.37 A harsher punishment is
assumed to be appropriate based on the generalized assumption that some
crimes result in greater emotional harm. In the rape context, for example,
the act of nonconsensual sex, even if there was no observable physical harm,
was understood to be intrinsically harmful to victims’ emotional well-being.38 But neither emotional harm nor even physical harm is an element of
the crime of rape.39
Other crimes integrate generalized assumptions about emotional harm
to particular classes of victims—for example, the laws that specifically punish conduct that is understood to be emotionally harmful to children. The
laws that criminalize child molestation and child pornography are particularly severe and designed to address not just possible physical injury that
may result from these crimes but also psychic harm that is understood to be
especially long lasting and acute.40 Again, however, these crimes do not require the prosecutor to prove emotional harm; the role of emotion is
implicit.

because it was a violation of men’s property rights in their daughters or wives. See, e.g., Susan
Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape 7–9 (1975).
35. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 812.13(1) (2013).
36. See, e.g., U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B2.1 cmt. background (2013)
(distinguishing further between residential burglary—which is understood to be more psychologically injurious and thus deserving of higher penalties—and commercial burglary).
37. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 261 (West 2014) (omitting any reference to victim’s
emotional harm).
38. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and
Law 111 (1987) (noting that rape shield laws were created to protect women from the “humiliation” of being “raped again on the stand” by having their sexual past disclosed at trial). Here,
the suggestion is that the emotional harm of the crime would be exacerbated by the further
emotional harm that would result from testimony about the victim’s prior sexual history.
39. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 261. Some aggravated rape statutes, however, do include
the requirement that the victim suffer serious bodily injury. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 22(a)
(2012).
40. See, e.g., Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2251–53 (2012); Audrey Rogers, Child Pornography’s Forgotten Victims, 28 Pace L. Rev.
847, 852–54, 856–58 (2008).
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Similarly, hate crime laws are justified based on emotional harm to victims and victims’ identity groups,41 yet emotional harm is not an independent element of these crimes. Rather, the laws are grounded in a belief that,
as a general matter, bias-motivated conduct is more harmful than the same
conduct without the bias motive and therefore should be punished more
severely.42 Accordingly, advocates of hate crime legislation have relied on
generalized claims about the emotional harm caused by bias-motivated conduct, both to victims and to victims’ identity groups.43 For example, consider the crime of defacing a religious monument with hate-symbol graffiti,
such as a swastika; the physical damage may be relatively trivial, but the
emotional harms are understood to be significant. The punishment for acts
of property damage or vandalism where there is a discriminatory motive is
meant to be proportionate to the composite harm incurred, including not
only the value of the property destroyed but also the resulting emotional
harm attributable to hate-motivated conduct.44 This effect on the victim and
the victim’s identity group is assumed, based on the gravity of the act.45

41. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 488 (1993) (noting the arguments by amici
that hate crimes can “inflict distinct emotional harms on their victims”). Hate crime laws are
also justified as important in sending a message to society at large. See Lawrence, supra note
17, at 255.
42. See, e.g., Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, Punishing Hatred and Prejudice, 56
Stan. L. Rev. 1081, 1085 (2004).
43. Id. For example, some studies suggest that, irrespective of race, symptoms such as
anxiety, depression, and isolation are frequent in bias-crime victims, and this finding would
support a generalized understanding of emotional harm that does not require further inquiry
into the specific experience of a particular victim. Some criticize this blanket assumption,
questioning whether it is fair to assume that a bias-motivated crime is, at all times, more
harmful than a non-bias-motivated crime. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of
Deterrence, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 413, 468 (1999).
44. See Frederick M. Lawrence, The Punishment of Hate: Toward a Normative Theory of
Bias-Motivated Crimes, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 320 (1994) (articulating a theory for why hate crimes
cause greater harm and therefore should receive more severe punishments than their parallel
crimes). Many oppose this rationale, questioning both its conceptual and empirical validity.
See, e.g., Anthony M. Dillof, The Importance of Being Biased, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 1678, 1684
(2000) (book review). But a nonphysical-harm-based explanation continues to be a widespread justification for hate crime legislation. Ely Aharonson, “Pro-Minority” Criminalization
and the Transformation of Visions of Citizenship in Contemporary Liberal Democracies: A Critique, 13 New Crim. L. Rev. 286, 297 (2010).
45. But see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:16-1 (West 2005 & Supp. 2014) (looking to whether the
victim “reasonably believed” that “the offense was committed with a purpose to intimidate the
victim . . . because of race, color, religion, gender, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, national origin, or ethnicity”). New Jersey’s bias-intimidation law is unique
but recently gained national attention when Dharun Ravi was charged in connection with the
suicide of Tyler Clementi. Indictment for State of New Jersey, State v. Ravi, No. 10002861,
2011 WL 7656976 (N.J. Super. Apr. 20, 2011) (charging a college student for filming the sexual
encounter of his gay roommate, who committed suicide as a result).
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C. The Unique Role of Fear
The law has always been particularly solicitous of one victim emotion:
fear of imminent bodily harm. The law treats fear differently from other
emotions; sometimes this is only implicit in the crime’s definition, and
sometimes it is more explicit.
For example, threats of violence are assumed to result in fear, even if the
threat does not include actual attempted violence.46 Rather, there is a generalized assumption that the threat itself would put a victim in fear, and a
threat is punishable even if there is no proof that the defendant intended to
go through with an attack or that the defendant committed any act that
came close to actually completing the crime. Furthermore, if property is
unlawfully obtained through a threat of violence (for example, robbery), it is
punished more severely than if the same property were obtained through
fraud or embezzlement.47
Terrorism is considered to be more serious than other violent acts of
comparable magnitude because it is assumed to produce a heightened emotional response.48 Specifically, the intent to terrorize—or the nature of the
act (such as exploding a bomb instead of firing a gun)—is assumed to inspire widespread fear.49 Here again, criminal law takes fear into account
when delineating the severity of crimes and devising a hierarchy of
punishment.
While many have assumed that fear is a subset of the broader category
of emotional distress,50 in the context of criminal law, fear can be better
understood as connected to a particular and expected result rather than as
an intrinsic emotional state. For example, the classic case of assault occurs
when the defendant throws a punch but misses the victim, sparing the victim serious injury but still causing reasonable fear; it was only through sheer
luck (or the defendant’s terribly bad aim) that the victim was spared.51 In
this paradigmatic case, there is the defendant’s intent coupled with a criminal act that put the victim in fear of imminent harm. In this context, the
“reasonable fear” is directly related to the possibility of a particular serious

46. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992). Thus, the law seems to
care about fear itself and does not concern itself solely with impending physical violence.
47. For example, under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, compare the base offense level
for robbery (20) with that for general fraud (7). USSG §§ 2B1.1, 2B3.1.
48. See Burton Leiser, Terrorism, Guerilla Warfare, and International Morality, 12 Stan. J.
Int’l Stud. 39, 39 (1977).
49. Terrorism also carries a substantial sentencing enhancement of twelve levels. Thomas
W. Hutchison et al., Federal Sentencing Law & Practice § 3A1.4 (2014 ed. 2014).
50. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Miller, Note, Toxic Torts and Emotional Distress: The Case for an
Independent Cause of Action for Fear of Future Harm, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 681, 684 (1998).
51. There are, however, other instances of assault where the defendant intends to inspire
fear in the victim rather than strike the victim—for example, the defendant points a gun at the
victim knowing that the gun is unloaded, but the victim believes that the gun is loaded.
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injury or death—much like in the “near-miss” context of tort law.52 In other
words, the answer to “Fear of what?” is a specific physical injury.
Accordingly, the question in fear cases is not about how painful or distressing the experience of fear was for the victim. Rather, the question is
whether the victim (reasonably) anticipated a substantial risk of physical
harm. Thus, the focus is on the victim’s predictions of future events or
risks53 rather than on the victim’s emotional experience. In fact, one could
just as easily replace the term “fear” with “anticipation” or “expectation” of
physical harm, without changing the meaning of the statute.54
Why has the criminal law historically prioritized fear of physical harm
over other emotions? One plausible explanation is that the reasonableness of
the expectation of harm is more objectively observable than is the depth of
any given emotion. This objective dimension allows the criminal law to be
predictable, to give notice to defendants, and to provide proportional penalties. While there will always be some murkiness associated with what constitutes “reasonable fear,”55 many believe that requiring that the fear of
imminent harm be “reasonable” is indispensable56 to providing proportional
penalties and predictability—two cornerstones of criminal punishment.57
The implicit approach is desirable precisely because it manages to take
victim emotion into account without predicating criminal liability on the
existence of a victim’s emotional harm. This approach thus strikes a valuable
52. John C.P. Goldberg et al., Tort Law: Responsibilities and Redress 131 (3d ed.
2012).
53. Similarly, the mental state element of result crimes concerns the defendant’s prediction of future events or risks. Indeed, we often expect criminal juries to assess what individuals
expected about the future.
54. By contrast, CIED statutes address actual emotional experiences—rather than predicted events—and are thus more amorphous. See infra Section III.A.3.
55. The question of what constitutes reasonable fear has been explored extensively in the
context of civil liability for exposure to lethal agents, such as asbestos, and communicable
diseases, such as AIDS. See, e.g., Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is There a Need
for an Administrative Alternative?, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 1819, 1849 n.126 (1992); Andrew R.
Klein, Fear of Disease and the Puzzle of Futures Cases in Tort, 35 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 965, 970
(2002); John Patrick Darby, Note, Tort Liability for the Transmission of the AIDS Virus: Damages for Fear of AIDS and Prospective AIDS, 45 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 185, 192 (1988). For a
discussion of the “selectivity” of fear, which may undermine its reliability, see, for example,
Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear 224 (2005).
56. E.g., Cynthia Lee, Murder and the Reasonable Man: Passion and Fear in the
Criminal Courtroom 269 (2003).
57. Beyond this general principle, however, there is reason to wonder whether the criminal law succeeds in its goal of proportionality. For example, the aimed but unloaded gun likely
causes much more fear than the poorly thrown punch, and yet the criminal law classifies both
as simple assaults that carry the same penalties. When considered in tandem, these two examples suggest a lack of proportionality, at least as concerns the victim’s reactions. By contrast, in
the CIED context, the strength of the victim’s emotional reaction often determines whether a
crime has been committed, a situation that presents a separate set of concerns. See infra Section III.A.3. For example, in the aforementioned example where the victim received a letter
that constitutes an unwanted communication, if she had merely called a friend, complaining
that “this really annoys me,” rather than calling the police to report harassment, there surely
would have been no criminal liability. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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compromise, acknowledging the importance of emotional harm while refusing to adjudicate the nuances of victim emotion in individual cases.
II. Explicit Consideration of Victim Emotion
While the implicit approach has dominated substantive criminal law,
more explicit consideration of victim emotion has emerged in the criminalprocedure and civil-law contexts. Part II identifies these legal developments,
which preceded the first CIED statutes, and highlights their limiting principles as a contrast to the increasingly expansive scope of CIED laws.
A. The Victims’ Rights Movement and Victim Impact Statements
This Section highlights the central role of the victims’ rights movement
in the sentencing context, which foreshadowed its role in shaping CIED law.
Although criminal law traditionally has addressed victims’ emotional harm
implicitly, the victims’ rights movement has worked to make victims’ emotions an explicit concern of criminal procedure through such innovations as
victim impact statements.58 Since the early 1970s, the victims’ rights movement has been concerned with domestic violence and rape cases and, in
particular, with airing the victim’s voice in the prosecutorial process.59 In
1982, the President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime recommended introducing victim impact statements during the sentencing process in order to
help the sentencing court understand the full extent of harm that the offender’s conduct caused the victim, including emotional and psychological
harm.60
58. Of course, the victims’ rights movement, and victim impact statements specifically, is
not concerned exclusively with victim emotion; for example, as part of a victim impact statement, the victim could speak about harms that are not strictly emotional. For a general background of the victims’ rights movement, see Douglas E. Beloof et al., Victims in
Criminal Procedure (3d ed. 2010), and Shirley S. Abrahamson, Redefining Roles: The Victims’ Rights Movement, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 517. For a critique and illustration of unintended
consequences associated with the successes of the victims’ rights movement, see Jeannie Suk,
Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 Yale L.J. 2 (2006) (critiquing no-drop policies and suggesting
that prosecutors’ enforcement of protective orders has resulted in a loss of autonomy for victims of domestic violence).
59. See Peggy M. Tobolowsky et al., Crime Victim Rights and Remedies 8–9 (2d
ed. 2010).
60. President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime, Final Report 18, 33, 72–73
(1982), available at http://www.ovc.gov/publications/presdntstskforcrprt/87299.pdf; see also
Kristin Henning, What’s Wrong with Victims’ Rights in Juvenile Court?: Retributive Versus Rehabilitative Systems of Justice, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 1107, 1111, 1127 (2009). In 1991, the Supreme
Court upheld the use of victim impact statements in capital cases, reversing its precedent from
four years earlier. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), overruling Booth v. Maryland, 482
U.S. 496 (1987). While still criticized by many academics and practitioners, victim impact
statements are now an established part of criminal sentencing practice, and they are often
considered the most sweeping achievement of the victims’ rights movement in criminal law.
See, e.g., Bandes, Victims, supra note 17, at 11; Aya Gruber, A Distributive Theory of Criminal
Law, 52 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1, 41 (2010).
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Victims’ rights advocates universally heralded the introduction of victim
impact statements as a momentous victory, and their diverse rationales foreshadow some of the arguments used to justify CIED statutes. Some viewed
victim impact statements as serving “the retributive goals of the criminal
justice system,” arguing that such evidence is crucial to help a judge impose
sentences that “accurately reflect the harm caused to the victim.”61 Others
focused less on punishing the offender, valuing victim impact statements
instead primarily for expressing the proper social concern for the victim62 or
for empowering the victim and aiding in the victim’s search for emotional
healing.63 Some advocates put forth an equality argument, contending that,
for reasons of fairness and justice, especially in light of opportunities for the
defendant to offer mitigating evidence, the court should hear both the victim and the defendant.64 Critics of victim impact statements argued that the
statements “pollute” the sentencing process, overshadowing objectivity and
reason while injecting excessive emotion.65
Along with the rise of the victims’ rights movement, in recent decades
emotional well-being has become increasingly prominent in popular and academic discourse. This phenomenon is characterized by a belief in “the selfevidence and therefore the objectivity of painful feeling.”66 The trend toward
prioritizing emotional well-being is evidenced by the classification of “happiness studies” as a discipline,67 the surge in self-help volumes, and the extensive academic work on trauma.68 Additionally, as emotional trauma,
associated with post-traumatic stress disorder and other diagnoses, has
gained prominence as a medical disorder, the notion of emotional distress as
tangible, even in the absence of physical signs, has become more accepted.69
61. Henning, supra note 60, at 1129.
62. See Bandes, Empathy, supra note 17, at 362. See generally Erin Ann O’Hara & Douglas
Yarn, On Apology and Consilience, 77 Wash. L. Rev. 1121, 1122–26 (2002) (considering the
value and potential effects of apologies on victims).
63. Robert P. Mosteller, Victim Impact Evidence: Hard to Find the Real Rules, 88 Cornell
L. Rev. 543, 548–49 (2003).
64. Payne, 501 U.S. at 825 (citing Booth, 482 U.S. at 517 (White, J., dissenting)).
65. See, e.g., Erez, supra note 17, at 484; Kenji Yoshino, The City and the Poet, 114 Yale
L.J. 1835, 1869 (2005).
66. Lauren Berlant, The Subject of True Feeling: Pain, Privacy, and Politics, in Left Legalism/Left Critique 105, 107 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002) (emphasis omitted).
67. See, e.g., The Journal of Happiness Studies, which is a peer-reviewed publication
that describes itself as “an interdisciplinary forum on subjective well-being.”
68. See, e.g., Jeannie Suk, The Trajectory of Trauma: Bodies and Minds of Abortion Discourse, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1193 (2010). While this Article does not attempt to prove a causal
link between CIED statutes and any of the recent developments that have brought emotions
more squarely into mainstream discourse, this broader cultural shift is one possible explanation worth exploring. In any event, it affects the ways in which laws are likely to be applied.
See, e.g., Stephanie Francis Cahill, Bring It On: Parents Take Schools to Court over Cheerleading
Cuts, Other ‘Hurt Feelings’, 2 ABA J. E-Report, no. 13, Apr. 4, 2003 (chronicling a spate of
recent cases that suggests “ ‘hurt feelings’ lawsuits are on the rise”).
69. Francis X. Shen, Mind, Body, and the Criminal Law, 97 Minn. L. Rev. 2036, 2038
(2013).
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Critics refer to this trend as the “feeling culture,” and some argue that
the increased emphasis on psychic harm leads to individuals’ overidentifying
with their experience of trauma and eventually allowing it to define them.70
Critics also describe the unbridled expansion of the “ambit of trauma.”71
Whereas in earlier eras trauma was associated with extreme events such as
war or rape,72 modern-day psychologists claim that “workplace harassment,
including overhearing sexual jokes, or even rude comments, can be a
diagnosable cause of PTSD.”73 Of course, a huge gulf exists between the
trauma of war and rape and that of overhearing sexual jokes, but psychological research suggests that a wide range of losses, such as the death of a loved
one or divorce, can be the source of severe, long-lasting emotional distress.74
This research raises questions about whether and how the law should
account for various sources of emotional distress and when the law should
formally name someone a victim for the purpose of tort compensation or
criminal liability. These contested questions set the stage for the Article’s
examination of legal developments that regulate and, increasingly, criminalize the infliction of emotional distress.75
B. The Civil-Law Context
Substantive law’s first foray into explicitly considering victims’ independent emotional harm was in the tort context. Early understandings of emotional harm as noncompensable yielded to limited acceptance of emotional
harm as compensable in the civil-law context through the doctrines of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.76 The civil law introduced the regulation of emotional harm, and an examination of the
development of emotional distress torts helps both to contextualize the
70. See, e.g., Berlant, supra note 66, at 125–26; see also Wendy Brown, Wounded Attachments, 21 Pol. Theory 390, 400, 401 (1993) (describing the present-day culture as “streaked
with the pathos of ressentiment,” epitomized by “the triumph of the weak as weak” (citing
William Connolly, Identity\Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox 21–27 (Cornell Univ. Press 1991))).
71. Suk, supra note 68, at 1212.
72. Id.
73. Id. See generally Claudia Avina & William O’Donohue, Sexual Harassment and PTSD:
Is Sexual Harassment Diagnosable Trauma?, 15 J. Traumatic Stress 69, 72 (2002). For a general discussion of challenges to diagnosing PTSD, see Chris R. Brewin, Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder: Malady or Myth? 12–14 (2003).
74. The mind/body divide has the potential to become increasingly murky; at least one
court to date has ruled that, since “[t]he brain is a part of the human body,” PTSD, absent any
other physical symptoms, can be deemed a “bodily injury” by law. Allen v. Bloomfield Hills
Sch. Dist., 760 N.W.2d 811, 815 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008). By contrast, CIED statutes do not
classify emotional injuries as physical injuries but rather expand coverage of criminal harm to
include emotional injury, without requiring any medical or psychological diagnosis. See infra
Section III.A.3.
75. For a historical perspective on the increasing expectations of law’s duty to redress
injury, see Lawrence M. Friedman, Total Justice 63 (1985).
76. Some jurisdictions also allow recovery for emotional injury more widely in other
kinds of tort cases if, and only if, the emotional injury is linked to physical harm. See, e.g., Fla.
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emergence of CIED statutes and to highlight key differences between the
limited reach of tort law in this realm and the more expansive reach of CIED
statutes.
1. Emotional Distress Torts
The emotional distress tort evolved from early assault cases.77 According
to the assault doctrine, there could be no liability where a threat of physical
harm was not imminent. An independent emotional distress tort began to
develop in the late 1800s in a range of cases that did not involve physical
injury or threat of injury.78 Courts also allowed recovery for nonphysical
injury to relatives arising from the intentional mistreatment of their family
members’ dead bodies,79 as well as against common carriers, telegraph companies, and innkeepers.80 Early cases ran the gamut, from vicious practical
jokes that resulted in the plaintiff’s humiliation to harassment by overbearing creditors that left the plaintiff shaken.81
Legal scholars in the 1930s were the first to collect these various lines of
cases and distill them into a new emotional distress tort.82 While the First
Restatement of Torts explicitly precluded recovery on the basis of emotional
Stat. § 440.093 (2013) (allowing for recovery for emotional distress in the employment context only if accompanied by a physical injury from the same cause); Binns v. Fredendall, 513
N.E.2d 278, 280 (Ohio 1987) (explaining that a lower showing of emotional injury is compensable if linked to physical harm).
77. See, e.g., I. de S. and Wife v. W. de S., Y.B. 22 Edw. 3, fol. 99, pl. 60 (1348) (Eng.),
reprinted in Robert E. Keeton, Tort and Accident Law 85 (3d ed. 1998) (holding that
damages were appropriate where a would-be patron, upset that the bar he hoped to enter was
closed, swung an ax at the bar owner’s wife, and, even though she was not physically injured,
the court found that she had suffered harm such that her husband could recover damages for
assault under the writ of trespass).
78. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] 2 Q.B. 57 (Eng.) (holding that, where defendant played a practical joke on plaintiff, telling her that her husband was in a serious accident
and thereby causing her severe emotional suffering, defendant could be held liable and plaintiff could recover damages).
79. See, e.g., Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic Church of the Sacred Hearts of Jesus &
Mary, 186 N.E. 798 (N.Y. 1933).
80. Notably, internet servers, which may be the modern equivalent of telegraph companies, are generally not civilly liable for emotional distress. Samuel J. Morley, How Broad Is Web
Publisher Immunity Under §230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996?, Fla. B.J., Feb.
2010, at 8.
81. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Oxford Introductions to
U.S. Law: Torts 221–22 (2010).
82. See William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37
Mich. L. Rev. 874, 874 (1939) (“It is time to recognize that the courts have created a new
tort. . . . It consists of the intentional, outrageous infliction of mental suffering in an extreme
form.”); see also Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49
Harv. L. Rev. 1033, 1067 (1936) (“No longer is it even approximately true that the law does
not pretend to redress mental pain and anguish . . . . If a consistent pattern cannot yet be
clearly discerned in the cases, this but indicates that the law on this subject is in a process of
growth.”). In a similar vein, this Article synthesizes the diverse array of criminal statutes that
proscribes emotional harm, thereby highlighting the scope of CIED law.
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harm,83 the Second Restatement of Torts canonized the emotional distress
tort, which subjects to liability one who “by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to
another.”84
Emotional distress torts have long generated controversy, and courts
have struggled to define limiting principles.85 While these torts are firmly
rooted in the civil-law lexicon,86 courts traditionally have been suspicious of
them and continue to limit the circumstances in which tort law will compensate plaintiffs for independent emotional harm.87
2. Limiting Principles
a. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims
and “Outrageous Conduct”
To succeed in a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
(“IIED”), a plaintiff must prove that a defendant’s behavior was “extreme
and outrageous.”88 It is insufficient that a defendant intended to cause severe
distress to a victim or that the defendant actually caused such distress;89
instead, a successful IIED claim requires that the victim’s emotional distress
was caused by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.90
83. Restatement of Torts § 46 (1934).
84. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1) (1965).
85. See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, Emotional Distress in Tort Law: Themes of Constraint, 44
Wake Forest L. Rev. 1197 (2009). While this Article focuses on U.S. law, there have been
analogous debates and discussions elsewhere. See, e.g., Marian Allsopp, Emotional Abuse
and Other Psychic Harms 88–95 (2013) (discussing the range of opinions among British
academics, including those that would advocate abolishing legal liability for emotional distress
or “shock”).
86. Tort textbooks and hornbooks devote considerable space to discussing emotional distress torts (and their limiting principles). See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein & Catherine M.
Sharkey, Cases and Materials on Torts 68–75, 495–508 (10th ed. 2012); Goldberg et
al., supra note 52.
87. See infra Section II.B.2.
88. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d (1965) (specifying that defendant’s
behavior must be so atrocious that it would make an average community member exclaim,
“Outrageous!”).
89. Courts have dismissed many IIED claims after determining that the defendant’s conduct simply could not, as a matter of law, be deemed extreme and outrageous. Examples of
unsuccessful claims include “[t]he seduction of a victim’s spouse by the victim’s trusted advisor, the hurling by a store clerk of vile racist epithets at a customer, [and] the endless, bad faith
stonewalling of an insurance company on an insured’s obviously valid claim.” Goldberg &
Zipursky, supra note 81, at 223.
90. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1) (1965). This insistence on causation in the
common law is supplemented by such statutory limitations as § 230 of the Communications
Decency Act, which immunizes internet servers from liability for third-party content: “No
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker
of any information provided by another information content provider.” Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). Courts have interpreted § 230 to preempt state law claims
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A showing of outrageousness may provide evidence of “severe” emotional distress, another requirement of the emotional distress tort.91 Recovery by the plaintiff requires that the defendant’s act created an oppressive
circumstance that goes beyond the “common and unavoidable situations in
which a person faces extreme stress[,]” and the environment must be stressful enough to be “unbearable even for persons of ordinary fortitude.”92 IIED
cases often involve a power imbalance between the tortfeasor and victim—
an imbalance that the tortfeasor knowingly exploits93—and the Restatement
specifically references the abuse of a position of authority as a factor that
could constitute outrageous conduct.94
b. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims and “Physical Impact”
A plaintiff may also recover damages for negligently inflicted emotional
harm, although limiting principles tightly circumscribe the scope of such
cases. Some states allow negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”)
claims only if there was a physical impact (which may or may not result in
physical injury to the plaintiff).95 Other states require that the plaintiff
demonstrate a concrete physical harm flowing from the plaintiff’s distress in
for infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., Doe v. Friedfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d
288 (D.N.H. 2008).
91. 2 Dan B. Dobbs et al., The Law of Torts § 386, at 551 (2d ed. 2011).
92. Goldberg et al., supra note 52, at 223. While an outrageousness finding is primary,
according to the Restatement the victim must suffer emotional distress “so severe that no
reasonable man could be expected to endure it.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. j
(1965).
93. See, e.g., Brewer v. Erwin, 600 P.2d 398 (Or. 1979), abrogated by McGanty v.
Staudenraus, 901 P.2d 841 (Or. 1995) (example of an IIED case involving a landlord who
padlocked tenant’s apartment without taking steps toward a legal eviction and threatened tenant and her friends). See generally Susan Etta Keller, Does the Roof Have to Cave In?: The
Landlord/Tenant Power Relationship and the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 9 Cardozo L. Rev. 1663 (1988).
94. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. e–f (1965); see also 2 Dobbs et al.,
supra note 91, § 386, at 551. Courts analyzing IIED claims have suggested that “the more
power and control that a defendant has over a plaintiff, the more likely defendant’s conduct
should be deemed to be outrageous.” Graham v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 742 N.E.2d 858,
866 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). Familiar contexts include creditor–debtor, landlord–tenant, and employer–employee. See, e.g., GTE Sw., Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. 1999) (involving an
employer–employee relationship that was characterized by the employer’s abuse of power). In
the employer–employee context, for example, courts have reasoned that the power dynamic
intrinsic in the employment relationship may exacerbate the outrageousness of the defendant’s
actions and the severity of the victim’s emotional distress. Frank J. Cavico, The Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress in the Private Employment Sector, 21 Hofstra Lab. &
Emp. L.J. 109, 141 (2003).
95. See, e.g., E. Airlines, Inc. v. King, 557 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1990) (discussing Florida’s
NIED cause of action and section 500 of the Second Restatement of Torts, which requires that
the defendant’s conduct create “an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another”); Gilliam v.
Stewart, 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974), abrogated on other grounds by Meek v. Zell, 665 So. 2d
1048 (Fla. 1995); Howard v. Bloodworth, 224 S.E.2d 122 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976).
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order to recover on an NIED claim.96 Courts have justified the bodily injury
requirement as “designed to provide some guaranty of the genuineness of
the claim in the face of the danger that claims of mental harm will be falsified or imagined.”97
A distinct line of decisions, called “bystander” cases, allows recovery to
plaintiffs who, while not themselves in the zone of danger, are traumatized
as a result of witnessing the defendant carelessly cause physical harm to a
close relative.98 Notably, whereas in the zone-of-danger context there is still a
relational connection between the defendant and the victim (for example, a
driver who almost runs over a victim exhibits conduct that was not merely
careless in the abstract but specifically careless as to the victim), in bystander
cases the defendant is not careless as to the bystander’s physical well-being
(since, by definition, the bystander is out of the zone of danger).99 Instead,
these claims are grounded in purely emotional harm, premised on the notion that it is emotionally distressing to see a loved one in danger.100
The explicit approach to considering victim emotion in the civil-law
context is thus tightly circumscribed, much like the explicit approach in the
96. See, e.g., Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988), petition
for review dismissed 781 P.2d 1373 (Ariz. 1989) (discussing Arizona’s NIED cause of action).
CIED statutes, by contrast, have never required evidence of bodily injury.
97. Czaplicki v. Gooding Joint Sch. Dist. No. 231, 775 P.2d 640, 646 (Idaho 1989). Other
states award damages in “zone-of-danger” or “near-miss” cases because, while the defendant’s
carelessness does not result in physical harm to the plaintiff, the plaintiff, having perceived that
she was almost physically harmed, suffers emotional distress. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra
note 81, at 131. Courts will hold the defendant liable if the plaintiff can show that she was in
the zone of danger such that the defendant’s carelessness put her at risk of physical harm and
that this risk is what caused her emotional distress. Id. Scholars have also raised the question of
whether, irrespective of any physical impact, defendants should be held liable for emotional
harm based on merely negligent conduct. See, e.g., David Crump, Evaluating Independent Torts
Based upon “Intentional” or “Negligent” Infliction of Emotional Distress: How Can We Keep the
Baby from Dissolving in the Bath Water?, 34 Ariz. L. Rev. 439, 506 (1992) (“[R]ecognition of
the general tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress would impose liability . . . upon a
wide variety of ostensibly innocent activities. It would affect the conduct of a broad spectrum
of individuals and businesses, as indeed the tort law is supposed to do; in this instance, however, it would have unintended and dysfunctional results.”).
98. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 919–22 (Cal. 1968) (holding that, where a
person creates a risk of physical harm to another and it would be reasonably foreseeable that
such conduct would also cause emotional harm, the person creating the risk is liable for the
ensuing emotional distress). Notably, this expansion is nonetheless still predicated on the perceived risk of physical harm, whether as perceived by the person in the zone of danger or by
the bystander.
99. Scholars explain this extension of the traditional understanding of negligence as a
derivative or vicarious liability, that is, the bystander, as a close relative, is given the power to
sue “derivatively, as the vicarious beneficiary of the defendant’s breach of a duty owed to the
relative.” Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 81, at 133–34 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
100. To prevent a flood of litigation, courts have also limited the bystander category to
“close relatives of the victim who can demonstrate that they were distressed by virtue of contemporaneously witnessing firsthand the careless injuring of the victim.” Id. at 133; see also
Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 830 (Cal. 1989).
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criminal-procedure context, which is limited to sentencing. By contrast,
CIED laws represent a novel introduction of the explicit approach in the
context of substantive criminal law, and these laws are not subject to the
limiting principles that exist in tort.
III. Criminal Infliction of Emotional Distress Statutes
This Part identifies and examines CIED statutes, which include certain
laws designed to combat behaviors like harassing, stalking, and bullying.
Most significantly, what unites these statutes is the inclusion of emotional
distress, standing alone, as a distinct criminal harm. These statutes explicitly
specify emotional harm as the required result of the defendant’s conduct. In
doing so, they depart from the criminal law’s traditional, implicit approach
to victim emotion,101 and they thus bring into the scope of criminal activity
a range of behaviors that would not otherwise constitute criminal conduct.
CIED statutes go by a variety of names in different jurisdictions,102 but
there is tremendous overlap in their use.103 Yet despite their shared features
and overlapping elements, the scholarly literature has not drawn connections between the different sorts of CIED statutes in order to assess the scope
of CIED law. Instead, the shared text of these laws tends to be obscured by
the different situations to which they are applied. A peer-bullying case looks
very different from a stalking case involving intimates,104 and scholars tend
to focus on discrete areas of substantive law,105 such as the question of
whether a particular emotionally harmful behavior, like bullying, should be
unlawful.106 Yet it is crucial to understand these laws as overlapping, interconnected, and representative of the same phenomenon in order both to
comprehend the expansive scope of CIED law and to explore common
problems and possible reforms.
101. See supra Section I.B.
102. See infra Appendix for a list of CIED statutes and key features.
103. See infra notes 150–152 and accompanying text.
104. Furthermore, the colloquial understanding of “bullying” or “stalking” may not reflect the statutory text of CIED laws. For example, whereas many stalking statutes broadly
characterize criminal behavior as “harassing,” the dominant example of stalking in popular
discourse is as a particular course of conduct involving a deranged, obsessive man stalking his
desired prey, typically a woman who does not share his affection. Similarly, when advocacy
groups lobby for bullying legislation, they tend to have a particular peer-bullying case in mind,
no matter that the case ultimately gets charged under a stalking statute. The aforementioned
Florida case, in which police arrested two girls for stalking, is illustrative. Although the case
was colloquially described as a peer-bullying case, it was charged under Florida’s stalking statute. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
105. For academic treatments focused on the peer-bullying context, see, for example, Ari
Ezra Waldman, Hostile Educational Environments, 71 Md. L. Rev. 705 (2012). For scholarly
discussion focused on the stalking context, see, for example, Carol E. Jordan et al., Stalking:
Cultural, Clinical, and Legal Considerations, 38 Brandeis L.J. 513 (2000).
106. See, e.g., Leah M. Christensen, Sticks, Stones, and Schoolyard Bullies: Restorative Justice, Mediation and a New Approach to Conflict Resolution in Our Schools, 9 Nev. L.J. 545
(2009); Lyrissa Lidsky & Andrea Pinzon Garcia, How Not to Criminalize Cyberbullying, 77 Mo.
L. Rev. 693 (2012).
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A. Elements
This Section provides a taxonomy of CIED statutes, briefly outlining
their key features—act, intent, and result. By way of orientation, one sample
CIED statute reads as follows: “A person is guilty . . . when the person
knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person and
that conduct would cause a reasonable person to . . . suffer other significant
mental anguish or distress.”107 In this example, the prohibited act is “a
course of conduct,” the intent requirement is “knowingly,” and the degree
of emotional distress required to constitute a crime is “significant” and assessed on the basis of what “a reasonable person” would experience.108 Other
variations of the CIED elements are delineated below.
1. Act
Some CIED statutes specify conduct that constitutes criminal activity—
for example, following someone109—while other statutes either do not describe prohibited conduct or include a nonexhaustive set of examples. Wyoming’s statute, for example, includes some types of contact that could
constitute stalking, although the statute specifies that the list is nonexhaustive. These include “[c]ommunicating, anonymously or otherwise, or causing a communication with another person by verbal, electronic, mechanical,
telegraphic, telephonic or written means,” and the catchall behavior of
“[o]therwise engaging in a course of conduct” that causes emotional distress.110 In Delaware, no particular form of communication is specified, but
criminal culpability may attach where a defendant “insults, taunts or challenges another person.”111
2. Intent
The intent requirement for CIED statutes ranges considerably. Some
states require the defendant’s specific intent to intimidate or terrorize the
victim.112 Other states require proof that the defendant specifically intended
“to cause . . . emotional distress”113 or to “harass, annoy, or alarm”114 the
victim. Some states allow conviction under CIED statutes upon proof of the
107. Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1312 (2007 & Supp. 2012).
108. Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1312(e)(2) further specifies that “ ‘[a] reasonable person’
means a reasonable person in the victim’s circumstances.”
109. See, e.g., S.D. Codified Laws § 22-19A-1(1) (2006).
110. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-506(b) (2013); see also Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-602(1)(b)
(2013) (defining the actus reus as when defendant “makes any form of communication with
that person, a member of that person’s immediate family, or someone with whom that person
has or has had a continuing relationship”).
111. Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1311(a)(1).
112. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-3A-3 (2004 & Supp. 2013).
113. See, e.g., D.C. Code § 22-3133 (LexisNexis 2001).
114. Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1311(a).
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defendant’s “intent to . . . embarrass.”115 Other states do not require proof
that the defendant intended to cause any harm, so long as the defendant
intended to commit the act that resulted in emotional harm to the victim.116
Of those CIED statutes that do not require the defendant’s specific intent to
emotionally harm the victim, some statutes impose a negligence standard,
requiring that the defendant knew or should have known that the behavior
would cause emotional distress.117 For example, Utah, which uses such a
negligence standard, requires that, to be criminally liable, the defendant
“knows or should know” that the person would suffer emotional distress.118
Only Maryland’s CIED statute affirmatively requires that the defendant
be on notice that conduct is unwanted.119 Some statutes explicitly state that
the defendant need not be on notice and that the lack of such notice cannot
be used as a defense. For example, in Delaware, where stalking is a Class G
felony, “it shall not be a defense that the perpetrator was not given actual
notice that the course of conduct was unwanted; or that the perpetrator did
not intend to cause the victim fear or other emotional distress.”120
3. Result
CIED statutes uniformly specify a victim’s emotional distress as the result element. But the level of emotional distress that the statutes require
differs considerably across states. Some states require severe or substantial
emotional harm;121 others require significant emotional distress;122 and still
others require simple emotional distress.123 Many states explicitly clarify that
a victim’s emotional distress need not be so severe as to “require medical or
other professional treatment or counseling.”124
115. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.07(a) (West 2013). Some states include a catchall intent
requirement, “improper purpose,” without clarifying its scope. Ala. Code § 13A-6-90.1(a)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2013).
116. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1312(a); N.Y. Penal Law § 120.45 (McKinney
2014).
117. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1312(a); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-506(b) (2013).
118. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(2) (LexisNexis 2012).
119. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-803 (LexisNexis 2012).
120. Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1312(h) (Supp. 2012).
121. See, e.g., R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-52-4.2 (2002 & Supp. 2013) (requiring conduct that
“would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress”).
122. See, e.g., W. Va. Code Ann. § 61-2-9a (LexisNexis 2008).
123. See, e.g., 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12-7.3 (2012). A few states use terms other than
“emotional distress” to characterize the nonphysical harm that could give rise to conviction
under their CIED statutes. For example, Texas criminalizes behavior that may “embarrass, or
offend another,” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.07 (West 2013), and Maine criminalizes behavior that may result in “serious inconvenience.” Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 210-A (2013).
124. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1312(a)(2) (2007 & Supp. 2012). No state requires
that the victim’s emotional distress be serious enough to demand medical or other professional attention.
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States also differ regarding whether harm is assessed as part of an objective inquiry, a subjective inquiry, or both. Some states require both subjective and objective inquiries, asking whether a reasonable person would suffer
emotional distress under the circumstances and also whether the particular
victim suffered emotional distress.125 Other states require only a subjective
inquiry, asking whether the particular victim suffered emotional distress.126
In some states, there is no requirement of actual harm; thus, if a given situation would cause a reasonable person emotional harm, the prosecutor need
not prove that the victim actually suffered harm.127 For example, Utah’s
stalking statute does not require that the victim was actually afraid or suffered emotional distress.128
B. Expansive Tendencies
This Section traces the history of CIED statutes and delineates four ways
in which they have expanded the scope of punishable conduct. It also highlights the role of the National Center for Victims of Crime (“NCVC”), a
leading victims’ rights organization, in advocating for these reforms. Specifically, in 2007 the NCVC published a “Model Stalking Code,” which encouraged states to broaden the reach of their CIED statutes and proposed
model legislation. Many states have since complied with the NCVC recommendations, resulting in substantially expanded CIED statutes that may be
applied to a range of behaviors that could be classified as harassing, stalking,
or bullying. The expansiveness of modern-day CIED statutes is particularly
dramatic when examined alongside the traditional requirements of criminal
assault or the doctrines cabining tort law.
1. Expanding the Criminal Result:
From Reasonable Fear to Emotional Distress
This subsection demonstrates the development of emotional distress as
independent criminal harm. It traces the origin of the CIED result element,
from early assault statutes to harassment laws, then to stalking laws that
required fear, and finally to the relaxation of the requirement of fear in
modern stalking statutes and the elevation of emotional distress as independent criminal harm.
Reasonable fear of imminent injury is an element of assault in many
jurisdictions and in the Model Penal Code, which defines simple assault as
“attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious
125. See infra Appendix.
126. See infra Appendix.
127. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1312.
128. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (LexisNexis 2012). Utah’s stalking statute also does
not require that the defendant intended harm, instead employing a negligence standard such
that the defendant could be found criminally liable without intending the victim any harm
and without actually causing the victim any harm. Id.
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bodily injury.”129 Beginning in the 1960s, harassment statutes began expanding the “reasonable-fear” requirement intrinsic to criminal law assault.130 By the mid-1980s, every state had telephone harassment laws,131
which were designed to address practical issues attendant to the widespread
proliferation of home telephones, such as concerns about obscene and profane calls,132 repeated calls in the middle of the night,133 and tied up
landlines.134 Instead of requiring that the defendant’s conduct cause a reasonable victim to fear future harm, some of these statutes demanded only
that the defendant’s behavior cause a reasonable person to be “seriously
alarmed, annoyed, or harassed.”135 Harassment statutes, which broadened
criminal harm to include “annoying” or “insulting” behavior as distinct
from “fear of imminent injury,”136 presaged modern stalking statutes, which
represent the criminal law’s first explicit foray into criminalizing discrete
emotional harm.
Stalking statutes did not originate as CIED statutes, however. Rather,
early stalking statutes required that the defendant put the victim in fear of
death or physical injury; emotional distress was not enough to trigger culpability.137 Concerned that law enforcement was not able to intervene early
129. Model Penal Code § 211.1(1)(c) (1962).
130. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 240.25 (McKinney 2014); see also New York v. Keim, 308
F. Supp. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (discussing jurisdictional issues over New York harassment
crime).
131. Note, A Remedial Approach to Harassment, 70 Va. L. Rev. 507, 522 (1984).
132. E.g., Hall v. State, 498 P.2d 415 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972) (upholding a jury’s conviction where complainant testified that defendant requested that he be allowed to perform “unnatural sex acts on her person” and, when asked to identify himself, replied that he would do
so only if she complied with his request); cf. Sanders v. State, 306 So. 2d 636 (Miss. 1975)
(finding that the words “ ‘I want you,’ standing alone, are neither profane, vulgar, indecent,
threatening, obscene nor insulting” for purposes of a criminal harassment charge).
133. E.g., State v. Zeit, 539 P.2d 1130 (Or. Ct. App. 1975).
134. E.g., Von Lusch v. State, 356 A.2d 277, 283 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976), rev’d on other
grounds, 368 A.2d 468 (Md. 1977). When the harassment charge was based on threats conveyed by telephone, courts found that a single telephone call threatening bodily harm was
sufficient to violate the harassment statute. State v. Mack, 499 S.E.2d 355, 356 (Ga. Ct. App.
1998).
135. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2921(E) (1992); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-208(a)
(2005).
136. Arguably, these early harassment statutes largely targeted nonemotional harms—for
example, waking people up at night or keeping them from being able to use their phones in
the way they would like. In a sense, therefore, the aim of these statutes was to address the
problem of “disturbing the peace” through telephones. Modern stalking statutes, however,
have recharacterized “annoyance” and “harassment” as emotional harms.
137. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. Ann. § 11.41.270(a) (1993). The move to criminalize stalking
was triggered by a cluster of highly publicized murders in the late 1980s, most notably the
murder of television actress Rebecca Schaeffer by Robert Bardo, a nineteen-year-old who “carried a publicity photo of the actress with him, called her publicity agency several times, and
sent her fan mail.” Robert N. Miller, Note, “Stalk Talk”: A First Look at Anti-Stalking Legislation, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1303, 1303 (1993). In the same year, during one six-week period,
five women were killed by their former husbands or boyfriends in Orange County, California.
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enough to prevent violent attacks,138 some states modified their statutes to
include emotional distress in addition to fear.139
Since the first generation of stalking statutes emerged in the early 1990s,
the coverage of stalking laws has continued to expand. Many states now include a catchall clause that explicitly criminalizes any course of conduct that
causes emotional distress, even without traditional physical stalking behaviors.140 Some states reached that point by passing a second generation of
stalking legislation, while others modified existing laws to isolate or specify
emotional distress as criminal harm.141 The federal government has done the
same; in 2006, Congress expanded its law criminalizing interstate stalking to
include conduct causing “substantial emotional distress” to the victim.142
There remains continued pressure to expand the reach of stalking laws.
The NCVC’s Model Stalking Code favors eliminating such modifiers as “severe” or “substantial,” preferring that a stalking conviction require a showing only of “significant” emotional distress.143 The Model Stalking Code also
clarifies that emotional distress need not “rise to the level of psychological
trauma requiring medical intervention or proof of any type of long-term ill
effects.”144 Furthermore, the NCVC’s model legislation report notes that numerous courts have found that no independent expert testimony is necessary to substantiate a victim’s emotional distress.145
Recently, many states and advocacy groups have turned their attention
toward bullying, urging legislative reform that would criminalize the infliction of emotional distress in the peer-bullying context.146 In the context of
Id. By 1993, all states and the District of Columbia had laws that criminalized stalking behaviors. Paul Mullen & Michele Pathé, Stalking, 29 Crime & Just. 273, 274–75 (2002).
138. See infra Section III.C.1 (discussing the prophylactic justification for criminalizing
emotional harm).
139. See, e.g., H.R. 1168, 62d Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1999) (enacted) (amending Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-111 to include emotional distress); see also Nat’l Ctr. for Victims of Crime, The Model Stalking Code Revisited: Responding to the New Realities
of Stalking 40 (2007) [hereinafter Model Stalking Code], available at http://www.victimsofcrime.org/docs/src/model-stalking-code.pdf (explaining NCVC’s reasons for revising the
1993 Model Stalking Code to include emotional distress in addition to fear).
140. E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1311(a)(1) (2007 & Supp. 2012) (defining as criminal
when a defendant “engages in any other course of alarming or distressing conduct which
serves no legitimate purpose”).
141. See, e.g., H.R. 1168, 62d Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1999) (enacted) (amending Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-111 to include emotional distress). In 2010, the stalking statute’s
relevant provisions were relocated. They currently appear at Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18-3-601 to 602 (2013). See H.R. 1233, 67th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2010) (enacted).
142. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005,
Pub L. No. 109-162, § 114, 119 Stat. 2960, 2987 (2006) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 2261A (West Supp. 2013)).
143. See Model Stalking Code, supra note 139, at 48.
144. Id.
145. See id.
146. Legislative and advocacy efforts have included proposals for new criminal statutes,
for expanded education codes, and for statewide school policies to address bullying. E.g., Victoria Stuart-Cassel et al., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Analysis of State Bullying Laws and
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peer-to-peer youth bullying, advocates have stressed a need to intervene
before tragedy ensues in the form of teenage suicide.147 Although modern
bullying laws could cover physical abuse, these laws are primarily designed
to combat emotional abuse that is not covered by existing assault laws. For
example, the bullying laws are designed to address verbal abuse either in
person or on social networks. Here, even beyond a worry that nominal teasing or harassment may escalate into violent behavior, the dominant concern
is explicitly the emotional harm that could lead a youth to engage in selfabuse. And, in states that do not explicitly criminalize bullying, prosecutors
have turned to existing statutes, relying on a CIED theory: A causes B emotional distress. B commits suicide. A is criminally charged for causing B
emotional distress.148
Some states have enacted or proposed criminal laws specifically to address bullying,149 while others have appropriated harassment or stalking statutes to cover bullying behaviors.150 For example, the provisions of
Kentucky’s harassment statute were incorporated into the “Golden Rule Act”
(receiving an A++ grade from the Bully Police USA151) and include a nonexhaustive list of possible bullying behaviors that “cause another student to
suffer fear of physical harm, intimidation, humiliation, or embarrassment.”152 The range of possible harm is vast; for purposes of conviction
under the harassment statute, “fear of physical harm” is indistinguishable
from “embarrassment.”
While many states have modified their harassment laws to isolate emotional distress as criminal harm,153 the range of culpable conduct varies
among states with CIED statutes. Some states look to whether a reasonable
Policies 19–20 (2011), available at http://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/bullying/state-bullyinglaws/state-bullying-laws.pdf. The success of these efforts has been dramatic; in 1999, one state
enacted bullying legislation, whereas by 2010 twenty-one states had enacted bullying legislation of one sort or another. Id. at xi.
147. See, e.g., id. at 1; Justin W. Patchin & Sameer Hinduja, Cyberbullying and Self-Esteem,
80 J. Sch. Health 614, 619–20 (2010).
148. E.g., supra note 2 and accompanying text.
149. E.g., Idaho Code Ann. § 18-917A (Supp. 2014); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-458.1 (2013).
150. Various sources suggest applying traditional stalking or harassment statutes to bullying behaviors. E.g., Christopher S. Burrichter, Comment, Cyberbullying 2.0: A “Schoolhouse
Problem” Grows Up, 60 DePaul L. Rev. 141, 173–74 (2010); Tracy Tefertiller, Note, Out of the
Principal’s Office and into the Courtroom: How Should California Approach Criminal Remedies
for School Bullying?, 16 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 168, 216–17 (2011).
151. Kentucky, Bully Police USA, http://www.bullypolice.org/ky_law.html (last visited
Oct. 14, 2014).
152. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 525.070(1)(f)(3) (LexisNexis 2008). For purposes of comparison, according to Kentucky’s harassment statute, if a defendant communicates with another
with the intent to annoy, and if the communication is such that “a reasonable person under
the circumstances should know [it] would cause another student to suffer fear of physical
harm, intimidation, humiliation, or embarrassment,” the defendant can be convicted of a
Class B misdemeanor. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 525.080.
153. See supra note 146.
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person would have experienced emotional distress,154 while others look to
whether a reasonable person in the victim’s circumstances would have suffered emotional harm.155 The latter is a more subjective standard and takes
into account the victim’s preexisting level of emotional fragility, generally
without requiring that the defendant knew or should have known of the
victim’s particular vulnerability. In the CIED context, this further inquiry is
increasingly required by statute, and courts have delved into the depths of
parties’ relationships in order to determine whether particular behaviors are
liable to cause emotional distress.156
The Model Stalking Code advocates adding “in the victim’s circumstances” to those statutes that still use a chiefly objective standard.157 Incorporating a victim’s subjective circumstances in this way is understood to
address the concerns of victims’ rights advocates about cases where a defendant’s conduct might be viewed as neutral or even positive as a general matter but in a particular context the same conduct could cause emotional
distress to a victim.158 For example, in one case where a defendant left letters
of poetry on the victim’s windshield and mailed a few nonthreatening cards
to her house, the court examining how a reasonable person in the victim’s
circumstances would respond found that this conduct alone could reasonably cause the victim emotional harm.159
2. Expanding the Criminal Act: Beyond Physical Proximity
Although physical proximity was traditionally a prerequisite for any assault-related crime, technological advances made this requirement obsolete.
The widespread use of the telephone fundamentally changed the landscape
and gave rise to telephone-harassment statutes; the modern internet age has
further rendered obsolete the requirement of physical proximity and expanded the scope of criminal activity.
The rise of telephone use was accompanied by a perceived need for telephone-harassment statutes, which criminalized harassing communications
154. See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 210-A (West Supp. 2013).
155. See, e.g., S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-1700 (West Supp. 2013).
156. See, e.g., State v. Yuhas, 243 P.3d 409, 410 (Mont. 2010); State v. McCarthy, 980 P.2d
629, 633 (Mont. 1999); Bott v. Osburn, 257 P.3d 1022, 1026–27 (Utah App. 2011). Courts
have also relied on gross generalities and gender stereotypes to make assumptions about how a
reasonable person in the victim’s circumstances would likely react. See, e.g., State v. Ryan, 969
So. 2d 1268, 1271 (La. Ct. App. 2007); see also infra Section IV.D.
157. Model Stalking Code, supra note 139, at 37.
158. Id.
159. State v. Breen, 767 A.2d 50, 53 (R.I. 2001). This Article suggests that such examples
cast significant doubt on the wisdom of a subjective inquiry in this context. Some commentators, however, lament courts’ inability (in “credible-threat” jurisdictions) to use stalking statutes more widely. See, e.g., Wayne E. Bradburn, Jr., Comment, Stalking Statutes: An Ineffective
Legislative Remedy For Rectifying Perceived Problems with Today’s Injunction System, 19 Ohio
N.U. L. Rev. 271, 284 (1992) (advocating a subjective inquiry and using, as an illustration of a
case that should be prosecutable as stalking, the example of a defendant whose “modus operandi was to tape a pack of chewing gum onto envelopes that were addressed to his victim”).
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by phone. These statutes divorced assault from physical proximity. With the
vast spread in telephone use, someone could be miles away yet still engage in
assaultive behavior. Although some harassment statutes required a credible
threat of imminent harm, others did not, thus expanding the law’s definition
of assault.
Furthermore, because definitions of harassment are increasingly variable,160 notions of what behavior could be criminal continue to expand. A
prime example is the increased attention to cyberharassment, now that the
internet and social networks allow individuals to communicate with an increasingly broad array of readers and viewers. Many CIED statutes have been
expanded to cover cyberharassment explicitly,161 further expanding the possible universe of assaultive behaviors.
Thus, whereas the standard definition of stalking involves physical following (as with a predator stalking prey162), in many jurisdictions the legal
definition of stalking is significantly broader and includes any repeated communication, whether in person, by telephone, online, or by post. For example, in Alabama one can be convicted of stalking if one “repeatedly follows
or harasses another person.”163 By contrast, Alabama’s separate “harassment” offense clearly defines prohibited conduct as requiring that the defendant either (1) “[s]trikes, shoves, kicks, or otherwise touches a person or
subjects him or her to physical conduct;”164 or (2) “[d]irects abusive or obscene language or makes an obscene gesture towards another person.”165 Additionally, “harassment shall include a threat, verbal or nonverbal.”166 In this
particular context, the difference between harassment and stalking statutes is
significant. Stalking requires “repeated” conduct while harassment requires
only a single threat. But whereas harassing behavior, if repeated, would constitute stalking, the universe of conduct that could constitute stalking is far
more vast and varied than that which would constitute harassment.167
160. The sexual-harassment context provides a useful analogy; the definition of “sexual
harassment” has evolved considerably over time, and the law continues its struggle to define
the parameters of actionable conduct. See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112
Yale L.J. 2061, 2088 (2003) (noting the many different definitions of sexual harassment); Vicki
Schultz & Eileen Goldsmith, Sexual Harassment: Legal Perspectives, in 21 International Encyclopedia of Social & Behavioral Science 13,982 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds.,
2001).
161. See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-506(b) (2013).
162. According to Merriam-Webster, the definition of the verb “stalk” is “to follow (an
animal or person that you are hunting or trying to capture).” Definition of Stalk, MerriamWebster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/stalk (last visited Sept. 15, 2014).
163. Ala. Code § 13A-6-90(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013).
164. Ala. Code § 13A-11-8(a)(1)(a).
165. Ala. Code § 13A-11-8(a)(1)(b).
166. Ala. Code § 13A-11-8(a)(2).
167. Furthermore, although the result element for harassment is that the victim “fear for
his or her safety,” the result element for stalking is that the victim experience mental or emotional harm. Compare Ala. Code § 13A-11-8, with Ala. Code § 13A-6-90.1.
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In some states, the distinction between the acts that could constitute
harassment and stalking is even murkier, with both harassment and stalking
requiring “repeated conduct,” also described as a “course of conduct.” For
example, in Wisconsin one can be convicted of either harassment or stalking
if one “engages in a course of conduct” that causes the victim harm.168
The NCVC has published a list entitled “Examples of Stalking Behaviors
State Laws Should Cover,” but it clarifies that this list “in no way reflects the
full scope of possible actions in which a stalker might engage.”169 The list
includes “engaging in obsessive or controlling behaviors,” “disseminating
embarrassing or inaccurate information about a victim,” and “sending flowers, cards, or e-mail messages to a victim’s home or workplace.”170 Additional conduct that could be covered under CIED statutes includes calling a
person and hanging up, repeated emails declaring one’s love, or even repeated communication of apology.171
Academics have also contributed to an expansion of the popular definition of stalking. For example, in a recent Texas study of stalking, interviewers
attempting to gauge the prevalence of stalking behaviors began their interviews by providing the following definition of stalking: “deliberate but unwanted acts by a person to get your attention because he or she wants to
have a relationship with you, has a relationship with you, or assumes there is
a relationship with you when there is not.”172 Such broad definitions are
becoming more common in the academic literature.173

168. Wis. Stat. § 947.013 (2012) (harassment statute); Wis. Stat. § 940.32 (stalking statute). A significant difference between the Wisconsin statutes is that only the stalking statute
refers to “emotional distress” in addition to “fear of bodily injury . . . or . . . death.” Id.
§ 940.32. Thus, the result element distinguishes the harassment and stalking statutes, but the
repeated conduct could be the same.
169. Model Stalking Code, supra note 139, at 21.
170. Id.
171. Ashley N.B. Beagle, Comment, Modern Stalking Laws: A Survey of State Anti-Stalking
Statutes Considering Modern Mediums and Constitutional Challenges, 14 Chap. L. Rev. 457,
457–58, 63 (2011) (describing an “archetypal” stalking case where, after a breakup, a man
spent years calling, emailing, and leaving messages on social media for his ex-girlfriend begging her to take him back, apologizing, declaring his love, and sometimes making threats).
172. Glen Kercher & Matthew Johnson, Crime Victims’ Inst., Stalking in Texas 6
(2007). Under this definition, a bar patron’s single attempt to strike up a conversation with
hopes of beginning a more intimate relationship with a second—uninterested—bar patron
could constitute stalking.
173. See, e.g., Maria T. Lopez & Carol M. Bast, The Difficulties in Prosecuting Stalking
Cases, 45 Crim. L. Bull. 54, 73–78 (2009) (proposing a variety of amendments to Florida
stalking laws that would broaden the definition of stalking and make stalking incidents easier
to prosecute successfully); Mullen & Pathé, supra note 137, at 277 (“[S]ome complaints may
well be made about behavior that others would shrug off as part of life’s mundane inconveniences, [but since stalking is victim defined] perpetrators have to take their victims as they
find them—eggshell skulls, peculiar sensitivities, and all . . . .”).

March 2015]

Criminal Infliction of Emotional Distress

637

3. Broadening the Mens Rea Requirement:
From Specific to General Intent
While common law criminal assault required intent to cause fear of imminent bodily harm, the intent requirement for early harassment statutes—
the precursors of CIED statutes—was significantly more expansive. Most
specified the following requisite intent: intent to terrify, intimidate, threaten,
harass, annoy, or offend.174 Of particular significance is the chasm that exists
between intent to cause fear and intent to annoy or offend.
While early stalking statutes resembled traditional assault statutes in that
they required that the defendant intended to put the victim in fear of bodily
injury or death, many CIED statutes have eliminated this requirement.
Moreover, while some states require the defendant’s specific intent to intimidate or terrorize the victim in order to convict under a CIED statute,175
others do not require proof that the defendant intended to cause any harm,
so long as the defendant intended to commit the act that resulted in emotional harm to the victim.176
A general intent formulation is increasingly common and favored by the
NCVC’s Model Stalking Code.177 The NCVC “recommends that states incorporate a general intent requirement into their stalking laws instead of a specific intent requirement.”178 The general intent requirement in NCVC states
ranges from intentional179 to purposeful180 to knowing181 conduct; what unifies these statutes, however, is that there is no requirement that the defendant intended to cause the victim emotional (or other) harm. Thus, while
the conduct must be intentional, the specific aim of causing the victim emotional distress need not be.182

174. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-20-12 (2004 & Supp. 2013); Seattle, Wash. Mun.
Code § 12A.06.100 (2014), http://clerk.seattle.gov/~scripts/nph-brs.exe?s1=12A.06.100&s2=&
S3=&Sect4=AND&l=0&Sect3=PLURON&Sect5=CODE1&d=CODE&p=1&u=%2F~public%2
Fcode1.htm&r=1&Sect6=HITOFF&f=G; see also City of Seattle v. Huff, 767 P.2d 572 (Wash.
1989) (upholding statute against challenges of overbreadth and vagueness).
175. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-3A-3.
176. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1312 (2007 & Supp. 2012); N.Y. Penal Law
§ 120.45 (McKinney 2014).
177. Model Stalking Code, supra note 139, at 32.
178. Id. Some states have amended their stalking statutes to eliminate a requirement of
specific intent. Id. at 33.
179. E.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 120.45.
180. The Model Code proposes “purposeful” to modify defendant’s conduct. Model
Stalking Code, supra note 139, at 24.
181. See, e.g., R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-59-2 (2002 & Supp. 2013).
182. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1312 (2007 & Supp. 2012).
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C. Justifications
The primary justifications for CIED law are twofold: First, CIED statutes have been justified according to a prophylactic rationale, which is forward looking and stresses the importance of allowing police to intervene
proactively, before a serious, violent crime is committed. Second, CIED statutes have been justified according to an independent wrong rationale, which
holds that emotional distress is intrinsically harmful and thus worthy of attention.183 While the prophylactic rationale focuses on the need for early
intervention and the independent wrong rationale focuses on reshaping social norms to give credence to emotional injury, both of these justifications
are keenly concerned with protecting specific classes of individuals, namely
women and children.
1. Prophylactic Rationale
According to the prophylactic rationale, CIED statutes are justified to
prevent physical violence: they allow law enforcement to intervene before
the victim has been physically harmed.184 Legislative history suggests that
policymakers have frequently used the prophylactic rationale to justify CIED
laws.185 For example, according to Carol Hanson, a former representative in
the Florida legislature and a proponent of the state’s stalking statute, “the
intent of the bill is to stop the stalker before a more serious criminal offense,
such as murder, occurs.”186 Florida’s stalking statute, like many others, was
designed as a stopgap measure to protect women from harassment before
the defendant’s behaviors escalated to involve physical injury or the threat
thereof.187 Courts have also cited the prophylactic rationale as part of their
analysis in CIED cases.188 A Connecticut court justified its state’s stalking
statute as “compelling in providing law enforcement authorities with a
means for intervening in stalking situations early on, before the behavior can
escalate into something more serious, including physical assault.”189
183. While the prophylactic rationale essentially treats CIED statutes as specific versions
of general attempt laws, the independent wrong rationale has more radical implications, that
is, policymakers should criminalize behaviors that cause emotional harm without any regard
to whether such behaviors are likely to predict future physical harm.
184. See, e.g., Beagle, supra note 171, at 466; Kathleen G. McAnaney et al., Note, From
Imprudence to Crime: Anti-Stalking Laws, 68 Notre Dame L. Rev. 819, 890 (1993); Laurie
Salame, Note, A National Survey of Stalking Laws: A Legislative Trend Comes to the Aid of
Domestic Violence Victims and Others, 27 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 67, 100 & n.193 (1993).
185. See, e.g., Fla. H.R., Comm. on Criminal Justice, Final Bill Analysis & Economic
Impact Statement, HB 97, at 6–7 (1992).
186. Id.
187. James Thomas Tucker, Note, Stalking the Problems with Stalking Laws: The Effectiveness of Florida Statutes Section 784.048, 45 Fla. L. Rev. 609, 628–29 (1993).
188. See, e.g., State v. Culmo, 642 A.2d 90, 101–02 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1993); Curry v.
State, 811 So. 2d 736, 741–43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
189. Culmo, 642 A.2d at 101–02. The Culmo court also stressed the importance of “safeguarding the mental well-being of victims,” maintaining that “[p]roviding protection from
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The prophylactic rationale assumes that emotional distress is often a
precursor to physical harm and, therefore, that criminalizing emotional
harm in stalking or bullying contexts prevents future physical harm. Such
future physical harm might be imposed by the perpetrator (as in stalking
contexts) or it could be self-imposed (as in some bullying cases in which the
victim begins self-harming).190
2. Independent Wrong Rationale
CIED statutes have also been justified based on an understanding of
emotional harm as no less damaging than physical harm.191 According to the
independent wrong rationale, CIED statutes are crucial to educating society
and to changing social norms such that emotional harm will be understood
as an independent wrong.192 This rationale is grounded in psychological
literature that asserts the primacy of emotions and the interconnectedness of
mind and body.193 Various studies have documented a link between physical
and emotional well-being and have found that emotional stress can lead to
physical disease.194 CIED laws thus are intended to send a broad message
that behaviors such as stalking and bullying are not acceptable in a civil
society.
stalking conduct is at the heart of the state’s social contract with its citizens, who should be
able to go about their daily business free of the concern that the [sic] may be the targets of
systematic surveillance by predators who wish them ill.” Id. at 102. While the court thus signals support for the “independent-harm” rationale, such support is based on an understanding of stalking as entailing “systematic surveillance by predators who wish them ill,” which
implicates a far narrower category of interactions than many state CIED statutes currently
criminalize.
190. In the stalking context, the prophylactic rationale is concerned primarily with stalking escalating to violence, while in the bullying context the concern is both about escalation to
violence and also the possibility that, if left unchecked, more serious and prolonged bullying
behaviors might lead the victim to suicide. Arguably, the prophylactic rationale, when applied
to juveniles, highlights overlap between prophylactic and independent wrong rationales.
Whereas in the stalking context we are concerned mostly about the defendant’s inappropriate
behavior, in the juvenile context we are more concerned about the power of emotional distress
and the tragic consequences of emotional harm to an impressionable juvenile.
191. See, e.g., Lisa Nolen Birmingham, Note, Closing the Loophole: Vermont’s Legislative
Response to Stalking, 18 Vt. L. Rev. 477, 520 (1994); cf. Allsopp, supra note 85, at 93 (noting,
in the context of tort law, that “[t]here is no intrinsic hierarchy in these different forms of
harm”).
192. This analysis echoes that of the sexual-harassment context, where scholars have written extensively about the subordinating effects of gender-based hostile-work-environment harassment and about the law’s educative role in shifting norms. See generally Kathryn Abrams,
Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1183
(1989); Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 691
(1997).
193. See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., Bruce S. McEwen & Peter J. Gianaros, Central Role of the Brain in Stress and
Adaptation: Links to Socioeconomic Status, Health, and Disease, 1186 Annals N.Y. Acad. Sci.
190 (2010).
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The examples that dominate the discussion focus on a need to protect
women and children from emotional harm. For example, the enactment of
stalking statutes has been characterized as “part of a rapidly spreading effort
to protect women from the terrifying advances of obsessed men.”195 In the
bullying context, legislators have described criminal bullying statutes as critical to “help and protect the children.”196 In the cyber context, there is an
increasing concern about anonymous online groups or “cyber-attack”
groups that “attack women, people of color, and members of other traditionally disadvantaged classes.”197 Here, the concern is not about allowing
early intervention or preventing future escalation but instead about protecting vulnerable populations from intrinsic emotional harm.198
IV. Critique of CIED Statutes
Having outlined the elements of CIED statutes and their leading justifications, the Article now assesses these statutes critically. This Part highlights
tensions between CIED statutes and core criminal law values such as notice
to defendants, free expression, social consensus, and equality. In doing so, it
explains why these laws are unsettling: they make criminal responsibility
turn directly on a new, unpredictable, and subjective category of harm
rather than on clearly defined conduct and defendant mental states.
A. Notice
For punishment to be justified—and to satisfy the demands of predictability and fairness, two primary criminal justice values—criminal laws must
provide adequate notice to defendants. Many CIED statutes fail to provide
this notice because of (1) the breadth of terms describing both the prohibited behavior and the required result of the defendant’s conduct; (2) the
weak mental state required of defendants; and (3) the unpredictability of
emotional harm. After examining these issues, this Section raises concerns
about institutional competence, challenging the claim that we can rely on
195. Mitchell Landsberg, Stalker Laws Among Many That Will Take Effect Tomorrow; California Passed the First in 1990, Phila. Inquirer, June 30, 1992, at A5.
196. Aubrey Jackson, New Bill Could Criminalize Cyber Bullying, WBTW News 13 (Apr.
16, 2013, 11:59 PM), http://www.wbtw.com/story/21997569/new-bill-could-criminalize-cyberbullying (quoting South Carolina Representative Funderburk).
197. Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 61, 62, 66 (2009) (proposing the development of a “cyber civil rights agenda”). See generally Danielle Keats Citron,
Hate Crimes in Cyberspace (2014); Danielle Keats Citron, Essay, Law’s Expressive Value in
Combating Cyber Gender Harassment, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 373 (2009).
198. Legislators in other countries have also justified proposed CIED legislation based on
an independent wrong rationale, grounded in a desire to protect children. See, e.g., Canada
Looking at Criminalizing Cyber-Bullying: PM, Agence France-Presse, May 11, 2013 (quoting
Prime Minister Harper), available at http://gadgets.ndtv.com/internet/news/canada-lookingat-criminalizing-cyber-bullying-pm-365523 (“The Internet is in most ways a great development for our society. . . . Unfortunately, it has other purposes and other uses, and young
people are extremely vulnerable.”).
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institutional actors—such as prosecutors, police, and school administrators—to prevent the overreach of broad CIED laws.
Many CIED statutes do not specify prohibited conduct (instead relying
on a nonexhaustive list of unwanted communications), and thus they risk
criminalizing a wide array of behaviors that would be impossible to define in
advance.199 Furthermore, despite using such adjectives as “substantial” or
“significant,” CIED laws fail to draw a meaningful line delineating the level
to which a victim’s emotional distress must rise before triggering criminal
culpability.200 And the scope of CIED laws promises to expand further as
states increasingly follow the lead of the NCVC and classify lower levels of
emotional distress as criminal harm.201
The reach of CIED statutes is often vast since repeated unwanted communication is something that many, if not most, in this hyperconnected
world could allege.202 While school bullying may be the cause du jour,203
there are unlimited contexts in which criminal-harassment statutes could
apply; indeed, many repeated unwanted communications—by a stranger, by
a loved one, by a former loved one, at work, at school, online, off-line—
could potentially be encompassed by an expansive definition of criminal
harassment.
199. Here, the concern is both with the nonexhaustive quality of the list (that is, what
constitutes criminal behavior is not specified) and with the subjective nature of “unwanted”
(which adds to the difficulty in defining prohibited conduct).
200. For a related discussion of concerns regarding the threshold requirement for such
inchoate crimes as solicitation and conspiracy, see generally Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. Cal. L. Rev.
425, 435–36, 447–49 (2007) (describing the “inherent tension between the costs and benefits
associated with preventive interventions in general, a tension that grows sharper the earlier
that the intervention occurs”).
201. See supra Section III.B.1. While concerns about a lack of clarity undercut both prophylactic and independent wrong rationales for CIED statutes, such concerns are particularly
challenging in the context of the prophylactic rationale. If one intends to criminalize emotional harm qua emotional harm, while there still may be disagreement about what level of
emotional harm is necessary to trigger criminal liability, at least the harm one intends to
punish is the subject of inquiry. By contrast, according to the prophylactic rationale, the primary concern is preventing physical harm. Therefore, sweeping criminal legislation prohibiting unwanted communication—but with no clarity regarding at what stage behavior turns
criminal such that law enforcement can or should intervene—should be especially concerning
to those whose support for CIED statutes is grounded in the prophylactic rationale.
202. While CIED statutes could retain safeguards to prevent such broad application, this
concern becomes increasingly salient as more states adopt the recommendations of the NCVC
Model Code.
203. In Queen Bees & Wannabes, Rosalind Wiseman’s best-selling book about bullying,
Wiseman stresses the pervasiveness of gossiping and bullying behaviors: “If she’s over twelve,
girls have probably called your daughter a slut and/or bitch. And it’s just as likely that she has
called other girls a slut and/or bitch.” Rosalind Wiseman, Queen Bees & Wannabes 189 (2d
ed. 2009). Wiseman also highlights the pervasiveness of “Unintentional Bad Teasing,” suggesting that, rather than implementing a zero-tolerance policy, schools could better address
such negative interactions by informing the “teaser” that his or her behavior was hurtful,
which may precipitate a good-faith apology. Id. at 193–94.
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In addition to expanding the scope of harm that criminal law punishes,
modern CIED statutes have also adopted relatively loose mental state requirements. These statutes thus lack both clear directives and a specific intent requirement. CIED statutes have broadened the type of harm the
defendant intended to cause—and, even more troubling, many statutes do
not require that the defendant intended to cause any harm at all. While
regulatory offenses such as environmental or financial crimes may do away
with specific intent requirements, at least they feature clear directives, and
criminal liability is premised on a failure to follow these directives.204 By
contrast, the loosely defined harms in many CIED statutes are exacerbated
by their weak intent requirements.205
Furthermore, emotional harm, let alone degree of emotional harm in a
particular case, is highly variable and evades prediction. And yet, with rare
exception,206 CIED statutes neither require any warning to the defendant nor
any indication that future communication is unwanted. The same unwanted
communication may be a mere annoyance to one person but emotionally
distressing to another, and it may be impossible to predict ex ante how the
recipient of the communication will react.207
The unpredictability and variability of emotional responses help to explain why some CIED cases involve behaviors that may not at first blush
strike readers as criminal. For example, a defendant was charged under
Rhode Island’s CIED statute after he sent three nonthreatening greeting
cards to the complainant, his ex-girlfriend, over the course of two months.
These cards included a birthday card, a Valentine’s Day card, and a condolence card after the passing of her grandmother. An appellate court in
Rhode Island affirmed the defendant’s felony conviction for stalking, and, in
attempting to analyze the conduct that might have resulted in the complainant’s emotional distress, the court highlighted the “love stamps” affixed to
each of these cards.208
204. Of course, while the acts constituting regulatory offenses may be clearly defined, this
is not to suggest that all those convicted of regulatory crimes knew that their behavior constituted a crime, and this reality is one among many reasons why regulatory-offense statutes have
been criticized. See, e.g., Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress:
Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 Emory L.J. 1533 (1997).
205. A voluminous literature examines problems associated with weakening mens rea requirements in criminal law, and these same concerns are present in the CIED context, although they are amplified by the lack of clearly defined prohibited conduct. See, e.g., Erik
Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 703, 725–29 (2005).
206. See Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-803 (LexisNexis 2012) (requiring a “reasonable
warning or request to stop”).
207. See, e.g., Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact Testimony and the Psychology of
Punishment, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 419, 442 (2003) (noting that individuals “vary widely on how
they respond and express themselves emotionally” to the same act). Notably, recent psychological research on affective forecasting suggests that not even the person on the receiving end of
the communication will likely be able to predict his or her emotional reaction over the long
term. See, e.g., Blumenthal, supra note 22, at 161–65.
208. State v. Breen, 767 A.2d 50 (R.I. 2001).
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While some might argue that we can rely on institutional actors—such
as prosecutors, police, and school administrators—to prevent the overreach
of CIED laws, this assumption fails to take into account the diverse motivations of criminal justice actors, who cannot be relied upon to pursue only
the most severe CIED cases. For example, legislators may justify CIED statutes according to a prophylactic rationale, but prosecutors may prioritize the
text of the law rather than focusing on the stated motivations of the legislature.209 Notably, in one case, the defendant was incarcerated and unable
physically to harm the complainant at the time of the alleged stalking incident, so the prosecutor’s charge was not rooted in prophylactic concerns.210
While a prophylactic justification—the desire to allow police to intervene in
a stalking case before the stalker becomes violent—may have motivated
Montana policymakers to enact a CIED statute, that justification carried little weight at the prosecution phase in this case. Without further statutory
guidance, there is simply no reason to expect prosecutors to pursue only
particularly egregious CIED cases or to prioritize underlying legislative
motivations for CIED statutes rather than the statutory text.
Similar concerns are germane to the bullying context. One might think
that discretion represents a solution to overreach concerns, such that bullying need never form a basis for criminal prosecution if it is not very serious.
Yet some state legislatures are considering proposals to impose fines on
teachers and administrators who fail to report bullying,211 which would
make it far riskier for such actors to decline to pursue a case while encouraging them to err on the side of notifying the police. Proposed legislation that
would penalize teachers or administrators who fail to report harassing behavior raises the concern that an overly vigilant teacher or administrator
could unwittingly subject students to criminal prosecution for behavior that
is neither threatening nor physically abusive, such as embarrassing or insulting a fellow student.
The recent history of zero-tolerance policies suggests that schools are
unlikely to be voices of moderation212 or to limit the parameters of CIED
enforcement. And, in the CIED context, zero-tolerance policies may prove

209. For an analysis of how enforcement incentives can undermine legislative motivation
in the hate-crime context, see Eisenberg, supra note 24.
210. State v. McCarthy, 980 P.2d 629 (Mont. 1999).
211. See, e.g., Joe Nelson, Bill Fines Teachers, Staff Who Fail to Report Bullying, Associated
Press, Mar. 21, 2013, available at http://www.weau.com/home/headlines/Bill-requires-teach
ers-staff-to-report-bullying-199361511.html (discussing the recent bill proposed by Wisconsin
Republican Representative Bies).
212. See, e.g., Nan Stein, Sexual Harassment Meets Zero Tolerance: Life in K–12 Schools, in
Zero Tolerance: Resisting the Drive for Punishment in Our Schools 143, 144 (William Ayers et al. eds., 2001); Lindsey Tepe, Recent Cases of School Discipline Overreach Date
Back Further than Sandy Hook, New Am. Found. (Mar. 21, 2013), http://earlyed.newamerica
.net/blogposts/2013/recent_cases_of_student_discipline_overreach_date_back_further_than_
sandy_hook-81163.
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especially problematic because exposure to the criminal justice system carries severe consequences that could affect a student for the rest of her life.213
Moreover, there is serious concern that widespread discretion may result in
disparate enforcement. Recent reports from the U.S. Department of Justice
reveal that “[s]tudents of color are receiving different and harsher disciplinary punishments than whites for the same or similar infractions, and they
are disproportionately impacted by zero-tolerance policies—a fact that only
serves to exacerbate already deeply entrenched disparities in many
communities.”214
The rationales often invoked by advocates of CIED legislation emphasize
maximizing protection of victims, both from present emotional harm and
future physical harm.215 But while these interests are important, protecting
victims at all costs ignores the fact that criminalization imposes real harms
on the defendants, many of whom are merely children themselves. Specifically, in the bullying context, CIED laws raise concerns that laws passed to
protect a certain class of individuals (for example, juveniles) may end up
harming other members of the same class by subjecting them prematurely
and unnecessarily to the machinery of the criminal justice system. For example, a six-year-old boy in the Massachusetts public-school system recently
was reported to criminal authorities after “putting his hand in the elastic of
his classmate’s pants, touching the skin on [her] back.”216
Supreme Court precedent distinguishes between adults and juveniles,
and some of the legal distinctions are rooted in scientific understanding
about adolescent brain development.217 Yet CIED laws risk subjecting
juveniles, who are still undergoing social development—and may not yet
213. School teachers and administrators could instead be made responsible for being in
contact with parents and for working with students (in conjunction with mental health experts and other counselors) to improve the culture at school. For a comprehensive examination of education-reform measures designed to combat bullying, see Dena T. Sacco et al.,
An Overview of State Anti-Bullying Legislation and Other Related Laws (2012),
available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/State_Anti_bullying_
Legislation_Overview_0.pdf.
214. Sarah McIntosh, Federal Government to Analyze ‘Disparate Impact’ of School Discipline on Minorities, Heartland (Jan. 18, 2011), http://news.heartland.org/newspaper-article/
2011/01/18/federal-government-analyze-disparate-impact-school-discipline-minoritie
(describing the U.S. Justice Department and Education Department’s investigation of schooldiscipline policies and use of a “disparate-impact analysis” to assess concerns about disparate
enforcement).
215. See supra Section III.C.
216. Susan S. Silbey, Talk of Law: Contested and Conventional Legality, 56 DePaul L. Rev.
639, 639 (2007); see Maria Papadopoulos & Terence J. Downing, Touchy Subject, Enterprise
(Brockton, Mass.), Feb. 11, 2006. School officials claimed that “[t]his was done right by the
book,” Ralph Ranalli & Raja Mishra, Boy’s Suspension in Harassment Case Outrages Mother,
Bos. Globe, Feb. 8, 2006, at A1, and that “[y]ou have a policy, you have to follow the policy,
and we do.” Papadopoulos & Downing, supra. Another administrator explained that “civil
rights has no age limit on it . . . all such complaints must be taken seriously” and that
“[t]eachers are mandated reporters . . . . That’s the standard . . . .” Id.
217. Specifically, the Supreme Court relied on recent neurological research in its 2005
decision that ended the death penalty for juveniles, citing scientific research that shows that
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have the social skills to know when they are behaving inappropriately218—to
criminal justice proceedings.219 Many CIED statutes can already be applied
to juvenile-bullying behaviors,220 and some civil-education codes cross-reference criminal harassment statutes, further expanding the scope of CIED
law.221 It is crucial to examine the repercussions of linking juvenile behavior
with adult harassing behaviors—for example, when law enforcement is
called to intervene in a minor interpersonal squabble that a school administrator could more appropriately handle.222 In the juvenile-bullying context,
characterizing the same squabble as “harassment” may have drastic
repercussions.
Ultimately, the expansiveness of CIED statutes, coupled with the unpredictability of emotional harm, undermines fundamental criminal justice
concerns of fairness and notice to defendants. And those charged with implementing these laws cannot be relied on to pursue only the most egregious
cases.
B. Free Expression
Even if the definitional concerns were somehow resolved and the parameters of CIED statutes were defined in a clear way that provided adequate notice to defendants, CIED statutes run afoul of the core value of free

the adolescent frontal lobe, which governs judgment and impulse control, is not fully developed. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005), rev’g Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361
(1989). The Supreme Court again relied on neurological evidence in its recent decision that
eliminated life without parole for most minors. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464–65
(2012). These distinctions between adults and juveniles—which have been used to support the
proposition that juveniles should not receive punishment as harsh as what adults receive—are
also relevant to the CIED context. At the very least, in keeping with the Court’s framework,
juveniles should be given less serious, more rehabilitative sentences. But this Article argues
further that efforts to criminalize independent emotional harm are concerning overall and that
they are particularly alarming in the juvenile context.
218. For example, as in the case of the six-year-old boy who was reported to criminal
authorities for inappropriately touching his classmate’s back. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
219. See, e.g., Silbey, supra note 216, at 639–41 (describing the possible application of
criminal law to a juvenile).
220. See supra note 150.
221. See, e.g., Sacco et al., supra note 213, at 9–10.
222. Especially with respect to bullying, and also in many stalking situations involving
intimates, there is not always a bright-line distinction between the powerful and the powerless,
which raises further concerns about the institutional competence of law enforcement to police
this arena and of courts to adjudicate these issues. Many instances of “repeated unwanted
communication” are simply too nuanced to be captured by stark terms like “bullied” and
“bully,” which further complicates enforcement and adjudication of CIED cases. By contrast,
in the tort context, the law identifies specific status-based hierarchies—such as employer–employee and landlord–tenant—that, if abused, could support a finding of outrageousness. See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text.
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expression because they risk chilling and even punishing protected speech.223
Where there is no imminent threat of civil disorder or other serious harm,
free-expression rights are strongly protected under the Supreme Court’s
First Amendment jurisprudence.224 In the CIED context, often there is no
imminent threat, and prophylactic justifications for the statutes lack convincing empirical support. In the stalking context, for example, the evidence
linking emotional harm to future physical harm is inconclusive.225 And as
the definition of stalking continues to broaden, this link becomes increasingly tenuous. While some stalking cases lead to violence, the vast majority
do not. Moreover, recent studies suggest an inverse correlation between a
stalker’s likelihood of persistence and risk of violence.226
In the “bullycide” context, despite a strong correlation between depression and suicide, the evidence linking bullying and suicide is inconclusive.
Instead, bullying is almost always one of many factors—if indeed it is a
factor at all—to which the tragic suicide of a teenager can be attributed.227
Studies of gay youth suggest that, “once a child’s prior mental health was
223. See Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does ‘Hostile Work Environment’ Harassment Law
Restrict?, 85 Geo. L.J. 627 (1997) (using the example of “hostile-work-environment” legislation to illustrate how laws designed to change social norms may chill protected speech).
224. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of Saint Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). Notably, while the concurrence in this case focused on the overbreadth of Minnesota’s statute criminalizing hate-motivated speech, the majority opinion offered an “underbreadth” rationale, reasoning that the
statute was an improper content-based regulation and that “St. Paul has no such authority to
license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of
Queensberry rules,” a reference to the generally accepted rules of boxing in the nineteenth
century. Id. at 392. Arguably, states, in enacting CIED statutes, have resolved the “contentbased” concerns of the Court by substantially broadening criminal liability to address the
underbreadth concerns of the majority while failing to take into consideration serious concerns about overbreadth. CIED statutes, in essence, mandate that everyone follow Marquis of
Queensberry rules, and they define these rules according to the emotional well-being of the
victim.
A few CIED statutes have been struck down as unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kwiatkowski, 637 N.E.2d 854, 857 (Mass. 1994); State v. Norris-Romine, 894
P.2d 1221, 1224–25 (Or. Ct. App. 1995). One court observed that the “First Amendment does
not permit the outlawing of conduct merely because the speaker intends to annoy the listener
and a reasonable person would in fact be annoyed.” Long v. State, 931 S.W.2d 285, 290 n.4
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc).
225. While there have been studies linking stalking behaviors to domestic violence, sexual
assault, and other violent conduct, the vast majority of stalkers are not physically violent. J.
Reid Meloy, The Psychology of Stalking, in The Psychology of Stalking: Clinical and Forensic Perspectives 1, 5 (J. Reid Meloy ed., 1998) (reporting that, of the approximately
25–35% of incidents where there is any reported physical contact, most do not cause serious
physical injury, and less than 2% of stalking cases result in the death of the victim). Of course,
some may argue that, even if the odds are miniscule that stalking behaviors would escalate into
physical violence, early intervention is still justifiable.
226. Troy E. McEwan et al., A Study of the Predictors of Persistence in Stalking Situations, 33
Law & Hum. Behav. 149, 157 (2009).
227. Thus, proving causation in “bullycide” cases presents a formidable problem. For a
contrasting example, see Stephenson v. State, 179 N.E. 633 (Ind. 1932) (concluding that, when
a rape victim was still under the control of the defendant and she committed suicide, the
defendant could be held responsible for her death).
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taken into account,” there is no evidence that bullying actually predicts suicide.228 That is, bullies may target kids who are already emotionally vulnerable. The tragic loss of life provides strong impetus to “do something,”
however, and many advocate using CIED statutes to punish both studenton-student harm and self-inflicted harm.229
The desire to attribute blame in the wake of a tragedy has already led
prosecutors to file charges against alleged bullies, despite murky and inconclusive facts. For example, in the well-publicized case involving the suicide of
teenager Phoebe Prince of South Hadley, Massachusetts, District Attorney
Scheibel chose to prosecute six teenagers for the death of their classmate.230
This decision was made despite extensive evidence that, “when Phoebe fell
apart, it was because of a cascade of troubles” that extended well beyond her
experiences at South Hadley High School and her interactions with the six
teenagers accused of bullying her.231 Indeed, Prince had a history of psychological problems, including self-cutting, for years before she took her own
life.232 The empirical evidence does not show that criminalizing emotional
harm would be an effective prophylactic to physical harm in cases like
Phoebe Prince’s or others.
Given the strong impulse to act following a tragedy, especially one involving harm to children, policymakers should be especially vigilant to avoid
sweeping yet more behavior into the criminal law domain.233 The instinct to
draft new criminal laws in the face of tragedy should be counterbalanced by
a reluctance to expand the reach of criminal law, especially given the poor
conditions and lack of rehabilitative services in overcrowded American
prisons.234
C. Social Consensus
CIED statutes raise the question of whether the criminal law can be
trusted to assess and punish emotional harm caused by unwanted or offensive communication between any two individuals. And, if it can, is it possible to agree on an acceptable baseline of emotional tranquility, below which
the criminal law should be prepared to intervene?

228. Emily Bazelon, Sticks and Stones: Defeating the Culture of Bullying and
Rediscovering the Power of Character and Empathy 184–85 (2013).
229. For example, after the suicide of a twelve-year-old girl in Florida, a state bill was
proposed to make bullying a crime. Nicole Flatow, Florida Bill Would Put “Bullies” in Jail for a
Year, Think Progress (Mar. 7, 2014, 2:45 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2014/03/07/
3372181/florida-bill-would-put-bullies-in-jail-for-a-year/.
230. Bazelon, supra note 228, at 110–11.
231. Id. at 172–73.
232. Id. at 172.
233. See, e.g., Luna, supra note 205.
234. See, e.g., Kevin Wehr & Elyshia Aseltine, Beyond the Prison Industrial Complex: Crime and Incarceration in the 21st Century 1 (2013).
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Law’s legitimacy is at least in part derived from the assent of its citizenry,235 and where a strong social consensus exists about the criminality of
particular behavior,236 laws criminalizing such behavior will be respected.237
By contrast, where such social consensus is absent, laws lack some of their
force and may result in backlash.238
Notably, CIED laws and many CIED cases—like that involving the Florida girls charged with stalking for posting insulting Facebook messages—
have been met with vocal opposition.239 Controversy surrounding CIED
cases supports the claim that there is no social consensus as to the point at
which unwanted communication turns criminal,240 nor is there consensus
about how resilient a state should expect its citizens to be.241 While to one
person unwanted communication may be threatening based on past experience (either with the person initiating the communication or, quite possibly,
with someone entirely unconnected to the present event), to another it may
be a minor inconvenience. Indeed, one person might consider an ex-boyfriend’s condolence card a thoughtful gesture, while another person might
find the same card to be offensive and disturbing.242 As a society, we do not
have clear, objective guidelines to discern which reaction is more likely—let
235. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 Va. L.
Rev. 349 (1997).
236. Of course, a social consensus that a particular behavior should be criminalized does
not in itself mean that the behavior should necessarily be criminalized. For a discussion of the
problems associated with allowing the emotions of “shame” and “disgust” to dictate crime
definitions, using antisodomy laws as a case study, see Martha C. Nussbaum, Hiding from
Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law (2004).
237. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 28, at 405.
238. For example, Prohibition failed in large part due to a perceived lack of legitimacy
(reinforced by a lack of enforcement). Nat’l Comm’n on Law Observance & Enforcement,
Report on the Enforcement of the Prohibition Laws of the United States, H.R. Doc.
No. 722, at 55–58 (1931); Charles Merz, The Dry Decade 71–73 (1931).
239. See, e.g., Winnie Hu, Bullying Law Puts New Jersey Schools on Spot, N.Y. Times, Aug.
31, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/31/nyregion/bullying-law-putsnew-jersey-schools-on-spot.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Greg Toppo, Should Bullies be Treated
As Criminals?, USA Today (June 12, 2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/
story/2012-06-12/bullying-crime-schools-suicide/55554112/1; see also Silbey, supra note 216,
at 639–40 (describing the flabbergasted response of a community after a six-year-old boy was
suspended from school after touching his girl classmate’s underwear). See generally Maggie
Clark, Criminal Case Puts Focus on Bullying Laws, Stateline (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.pew
states.org/projects/stateline/headlines/criminal-case-puts-focus-on-bullying-laws-858995170
52.
240. For a general discussion about the lack of social consensus regarding what speech is
sufficiently offensive to be regulated, see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information
Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 Stan.
L. Rev. 1049, 1113 (2000). Presumably, the level at which offensive speech should be criminalized would be even more hotly contested.
241. For a discussion of the variation in average emotional temperament among cultural
subgroups in the United States, see Richard E. Nisbett & Dov Cohen, Culture of Honor:
The Psychology of Violence in the South 50 (1996). But see Posner, supra note 22, at
1985 (arguing that “people can cultivate their emotions”).
242. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
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alone reasonable—which suggests that it would be very difficult to develop a
consensus as to what constitutes emotional injury significant enough to trigger criminal culpability.243 This lack of consensus about what constitutes
emotional injury, combined with the varying (and often unpredictable) reactions of the people receiving the communication, makes CIED scenarios
uniquely murky, especially when compared with the archetypal assault case
that involves impending physical harm.244
Of course, law not only reflects society’s views but also helps to shape
these views.245 Thus, by criminalizing emotional harm, CIED statutes arguably may be useful both in legitimating emotional harm as significant harm
and in sending the message that certain behaviors are unacceptable, thereby
helping to change norms. And yet the lack of clearly defined prohibited acts,
which contributes to the concerns about vagueness and overbreadth, severely undercuts the expressive function of these laws.246 The criminal law
thus may not be an appropriate tool for changing behavior in this instance.
D. Equality
An argument common to both the prophylactic and independent wrong
rationales for CIED statutes is that the statutes are critical to protect vulnerable populations, particularly women and children.247 Despite the dominance of this rhetoric in the victims’ rights movement, however, there are
serious downsides to labeling particular groups as “vulnerable,” including
concerns about perpetuating stereotypes and facilitating disparate
enforcement.
CIED laws may further entrench stereotypes about the “emotional” or
“hysterical” woman.248 While statistics show that cases involving physical
243. There are of course other circumstances in which juries are asked to make judgments
where no social consensus exists; for example, when considering mitigating circumstances,
juries may be asked to use flexible standards in determining whether certain behavior constituted “adequate provocation.” But it is significant that, in the CIED context, the primary
determination is not the defendant’s degree of culpability for behavior that is indisputably
criminal but whether something constitutes criminal activity. This distinction dramatically
raises the stakes of the CIED inquiry. It also exacerbates earlier concerns about providing
notice to potential defendants.
244. To be sure, there are line-drawing problems throughout the criminal law. Cf. Shen,
supra note 69, at 2041 (finding that people do not agree about what constitutes bodily injury).
And the line between physical harm and mental injury is not absolute. See id. at 2041–43. But
conduct such as stalking and bullying—as currently defined by CIED statutes—cannot reasonably be defined as bodily injury.
245. See generally Lessig, supra note 31, at 948; McAdams, supra note 31, at 339; Sunstein,
supra note 31, at 2024–25.
246. Discrepancies between the scope of CIED laws as enacted and their enforcement may
also undercut the laws’ expressive impact. See Eisenberg, supra note 24.
247. See supra Section III.C.
248. The benefits gained by victims through expanding CIED statutes must be balanced
against the costs of further propagating such stereotypes. For a related critique of legal-reform
measures that patronize or stereotype women under the guise of providing increased protection, see Aviva Orenstein, No Bad Men!: A Feminist Analysis of Character Evidence in Rape
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harm are more likely to involve female victims and male perpetrators than
male victims and female perpetrators,249 any assumed discrepancy in the
likelihood of emotional harm is grounded in stereotypes about women.250
Such assumptions threaten both to perpetuate this stereotype and to unfairly
influence CIED enforcement. A concern exists that, when new statutes are
used (and expanded) largely to protect women and juveniles, this sends an
unambiguous message that women are emotionally fragile and should be
classified as vulnerable or even juvenilelike. This concern continues to be
borne out in practice,251 providing sobering examples of gendered stereotypes entrenched in the modern judicial system.
Notably, references to “emotional distress” did not become a standard
element in criminal law until stalking statutes were enacted. While no stalking statute is explicitly gendered—that is, none includes gendered pronouns
or explicit references to men or women—the media and popular culture
portray the crime of stalking as almost exclusively gendered: males stalking
females.252
One could argue that these statutes are a positive development inasmuch as the criminal law is taking the woman’s side and valuing her emotions rather than dismissing her as hysterical or debasing emotions as
generally unimportant. As with increased efforts to enforce domestic violence as a criminal offense,253 the move to criminalize stalking may also be a
by-product of feminist successes in criminal justice reform.254
Trials, 49 Hastings L.J. 663, 695 (1998) (“[F]eminists must be on the lookout for differences
in the law that may cross the line from acknowledging women’s different voice and experience
to patronizing women by providing them increased ‘protection.’ ”).
249. See, e.g., Victims and Perpetrators, Nat’l Inst. Just., http://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/
rape-sexual-violence/pages/victims-perpetrators.aspx (last modified Oct. 26, 2010).
250. Moreover, it should be recognized that the view that women are emotionally fragile
and in need of protection is itself controversial. And while it reflects a prevalent stereotype,
this view certainly does not represent the social consensus or a desired norm that the law
should work to reinforce.
251. See, e.g., State v. Ryan, 969 So. 2d 1268, 1271 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (describing the
emotional fragility of “womenfolk”). Ultimately, the trial court was overturned on the basis of
the specific intent requirement in Louisiana’s stalking statute. The appellate court’s analysis
demonstrates the importance of a specific intent requirement in avoiding convicting defendants where there is no intent or motive but merely a misunderstanding or a case of a hypersensitive complainant. See supra Section III.B.3.
252. Congress grounded the enactment of the Violence Against Women Act, which was
partially struck down by the Supreme Court, in a conception of stalking, sexual assault, and
domestic violence as gender-based violence. See, e.g., Julie Goldscheid, United States v. Morrison and the Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: A Civil Rights Law Struck
Down in the Name of Federalism, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 109, 116 (2000).
253. For a discussion of this and other feminist criminal-justice reform goals, see, for
example, Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State 193 (1989)
(discussing how privacy laws have protected men from prosecution for battery, marital rape,
and women’s exploited domestic labor), and Elizabeth M. Schneider, Battered Women
and Feminist Lawmaking 13, 44–46 (2000).
254. The term “governance feminism” has been used to describe (and critique) a distinct
strain of feminism that “has a will to power” and “wants to rule.” See, e.g., Janet Halley,
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But such successes are not without their costs, both to groups the statutes are designed to protect and to those who may be unable to call upon
the statutes due to stereotypes that effectively transform neutral statutes into
gendered ones. For example, there is serious concern that law enforcement
may not take as seriously claims that men have suffered emotional distress.255 Police might simply not expect that a man would be seriously distressed by the incessant contact of his ex-girlfriend.256 By contrast, the
criminal law might be more willing to classify as stalking an ex-boyfriend’s
pursuit of his ex-girlfriend where the ex-girlfriend claimed emotional distress as a consequence of the unwanted contact.257
V. Implications
This Part explores the implications of the above analysis for CIED statutes specifically and, more broadly, for the role of victim emotion in criminal law. It examines statutory-reform options within the criminal law as well
as approaches beyond the criminal justice system that are geared toward
combating behaviors that cause emotional harm. Finally, the Part applies
insights gleaned from the analysis of CIED laws to the broader question of
how the criminal law should approach victim emotion, and in doing so it
highlights the advantages of the traditional, implicit approach. The existing
literature has not grappled with the foundational issue of whether and to
what extent victim emotion should matter in criminal law, nor has it scrutinized CIED statutes in the context of that question. I show here that the
problem is not that the laws have chosen the wrong particular behaviors to
target. Indeed, there may be appropriate ways for criminal law to address
these behaviors, such as by prohibiting specific conduct that predictably
causes emotional distress, an alternative that would be consistent with the
more traditional role of victim emotion in substantive criminal law.
Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break from Feminism 20–22 (2006) (emphasis
omitted).
255. Here, it is important to distinguish between emotional distress caused by domestic
disputes and PTSD, which can be traced to combat or other experience of war. See Marcia G.
Shein, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in the Criminal Justice System: From Vietnam to Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fed. Law., Sept. 2010, at 42, 45, available at http://www.fedbar.org/Federal-Lawyer-Magazine/2010/The-Federal-Lawyer-September-2010/Features/Post-Traumatic-Stress-Dis
order-in-the-Criminal-Justice-System.aspx.
256. Studies from the domestic violence context may prove instructive, such as recent
findings that, when both a man and a woman were allegedly perpetrators of abuse, police
routinely arrested only the man. Chandra Gavin & Nora K. Puffett, Ctr. for Court
Innovation, Criminal Domestic Violence Case Processing: A Case Study of the Five
Boroughs of New York City 34–35 (2005), available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/
_uploads/ documents/Citywide%20Final1.pdf.
257. Some attribute such tendencies to the influence of Catharine MacKinnon and the
impact of “governance feminism.” See, e.g., Halley, supra note 254. Others, however, contend
that, while various feminist reforms have been enacted in the past thirty years, these measures
have largely failed to produce meaningful change in criminal justice outcomes. See, e.g., Ilene
Seidman & Susan Vickers, The Second Wave: An Agenda for the Next Thirty Years of Rape Law
Reform, 38 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 467, 467–68 (2005).
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A. Statutory Reform
This Section examines ways to address antisocial behaviors by specifying
prohibited conduct and thereby providing ample notice to defendants. It
explores ways in which the criminal law can avoid the pitfalls of CIED legislation by carefully circumscribing new crimes (for example, “revenge porn”)
and by reimagining existing features of the law (for example, by strengthening penalties for breach of protective orders). This Section then explores an
alternative approach—that of tracking the emotional distress tort—and
concludes that, while preferable to current CIED statutes, this reform would
still require an inquiry into victim emotion, a result that this Article cautions against.258
1. Prohibiting Specific Conduct
a. Revenge Porn
Instead of punishing defendants based on victims’ emotional distress,
policymakers should focus—when possible—on defining the criminal act. A
relatively new legal context—that of “revenge porn,” which is the act of
posting sexual photos of someone without his or her permission—is instructive.259 Revenge porn has been described as “a form of cyber harassment and cyber stalking whose victims are predominantly female,”260 and as
a result of a few highly publicized cases, some states have enacted revengeporn legislation while others currently have bills pending.261 California, for
example, makes it a misdemeanor to photograph or otherwise take private,
nude photos of another person and distribute the photos in a way that is
intended to and does cause emotional distress.262
258. This Article focuses on legislative questions and therefore will not address possible
constitutional concerns with CIED statutes in depth. Yet in light of the Supreme Court’s recent
as-applied decision in the context of emotional torts, Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011),
it is possible that some CIED statutes could be successfully challenged on First Amendment
grounds.
259. For a general discussion of revenge-porn statutes, their justifications, and their critiques, see Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 345 (2014).
260. Id. at 354.
261. New Jersey and California have criminalized revenge porn; bills that would do the
same have also been introduced in Maryland, New York, and Pennsylvania. Angela
Couloumbis, Pa. Bill Would Make Online ‘Revenge Porn’ a Crime, Phila. Inquirer, Dec. 10,
2013, at B1, available at http://articles.philly.com/2013-12-11/news/45038761_1_harassmentlaw-mary-anne-franks-explicit-image. Some of these bills are stand-alone, while others, such
as the Pennsylvania proposal, would amend the state’s harassment statute. See, e.g., id.; Del. Jon
Cardin to Introduce ‘Revenge Porn’ Bill, Balt. News J. (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.baltimore
newsjournal.com/2013/10/30/del-jon-cardin-to-introduce-revenge-porn-bill/.
262. Cal. Penal Code § 647(j)(4)(A) (West Supp. 2014) (“Any person who photographs . . . the intimate body part or parts of another identifiable person, under circumstances
where the parties agree or understand that the image shall remain private, and the person
subsequently distributes the images taken, with the intent to cause serious emotional distress,
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Policymakers have important choices to make regarding how best to
structure revenge-porn statutes, and they should endeavor to avoid the pitfalls of CIED legislation. First, they should refrain from following California’s example in making “emotional distress” the result element of the
crime.263 Otherwise, these laws focus the trial too much on the victim, which
may be a painful experience for victims, as has been documented in the rape
context.264 Additionally, focusing on the victim’s emotional distress may
make the state’s case excessively difficult to prove, thus essentially negating
the purpose of the statute. Instead, a preferable statute would resemble
Pennsylvania’s bill, criminalizing the specific act of nonconsensual distribution without including emotional distress as the result element.265 This formulation avoids an inquiry into the victim’s particular emotions or whether
a reasonable person would be emotionally distressed under the
circumstances.266
The revenge-porn context provides an ideal opportunity for policymakers to detail particular criminal acts without referring to the victim’s emotional distress. This approach would avoid the vagaries of criminalizing an
amorphous category of behaviors that may result in the victim’s emotional
distress. It would also sidestep the problems associated with delving into the
fraught territory of determining whether, and to what extent, a victim experienced emotional distress.267 As in the case of rape, if the underlying conduct is inherently objectionable and can be assumed to be emotionally
harmful in all cases, a prosecutor should not be required to prove that the
victim suffered emotional distress.268 Such an approach would also address
and the depicted person suffers serious emotional distress.”). In December 2014, the first defendant was convicted under California’s revenge porn statute and sentenced to a year in jail.
Veronica Rocha, Online Targets Find Recourse, L.A. Times, Dec. 6, 2014, at AA1, available at
http://www.latimes.com/local/crime/la-me-1204-revenge-porn-20141205-story.html.
263. Here, the focus is drawn away from the defendant’s conduct and directed instead at
the victim’s response, which raises many of the same problems discussed above in the context
of CIED statutes.
264. See Aviva Orenstein, Special Issues Raised by Rape Trials, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1585,
1599 (2007).
265. See, e.g., Pa. S.B. 1167, 2013 Sess. (2013) (amend. Jan. 14, 2014) (proposing, as a
definition of revenge porn, the posting of a sexually explicit image of an intimate partner with
no legitimate purpose and without the partner’s consent).
266. For a discussion of problems associated with “emotional profiling . . . where the
outcome of an inquiry depends on whether there is satisfactory proof that a particular emotion existed,” see Sanger, supra note 22, at 108, 111 (criticizing the “tyranny in requiring a
particular emotional response as part of a legal process”).
267. Of course, not all “harassing” behaviors are as easy to anticipate (and specifically to
prohibit) as revenge porn. Nonetheless, while it may be more convenient for legislators to
enact broad CIED statutes—thus deferring to the discretion of prosecutors—the aforementioned problems with such far-reaching statutes (and concerns about the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion) should motivate policymakers to think more carefully about exactly
what behaviors they intend to criminalize.
268. See Emily Bazelon, Why Do We Tolerate Revenge Porn?, Slate (Sept. 25, 2013, 6:21
AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2013/09/revenge_porn_legislation_a_
new_bill_in_california_doesn_t_go_far_enough.html (arguing that California’s revenge-porn
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concerns about predictability and notice, and it falls squarely within the
traditional, implicit approach to victim emotion in criminal law.
b. Breach of Protective Order
Where it is difficult to define a particular offensive act but where policymakers want to address emotional harm to victims caused by repeated unwanted conduct, legislation could focus on expanding the role of protective
orders and strengthening penalties for violating them. Civil protection orders (“CPOs”) are currently used in the domestic violence context by all fifty
states and the District of Columbia.269 State laws vary, but protective orders
are available in all states for victims of physical violence or other criminal
acts, and one-third of the states also provide protective orders for victims of
psychological, emotional, or economic abuse.270 Legislators in the remaining
states, if concerned with persistent emotional harm between intimates, could
extend CPOs to encompass a wider array of harms.271 These CPOs could
also be expanded beyond the traditional confines of domestic violence to
apply to intimates or former intimates who do not live together,272 and even
to situations involving acquaintances or strangers where one party causes
emotional harm to the other.273
In cases where limiting contact between parties would likely reduce
emotional distress, this approach would seem more fitting than inviting the
heavy machinery of the criminal justice system to intervene with no prior

law “only goes halfway” because it requires the prosecutor to prove that the defendant intended to inflict emotional distress rather than treating the defendant’s act “as an objectively
harmful invasion of privacy”).
269. Jane K. Stoever, Enjoining Abuse: The Case for Indefinite Domestic Violence Protection
Orders, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1015, 1093–98 (2014) (reviewing a fifty-state survey of domestic
violence protection orders).
270. Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies, and Reclaiming Domestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1107, 1134 (2009). Of states that allow for CPOs in
cases that do not involve physical violence or the threat thereof, many of the civil statutes refer
to the state’s criminal-harassment or stalking statute. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 741.28 (2013)
(cross-referencing Florida’s stalking statute).
271. For arguments in favor of such legislative reform, see Johnson, supra note 270. Notably, in many of the cases referenced that involved emotional harm, there were also incidents of
battery. While many states may prefer not to grant a CPO for name calling (even if frequent
and derogatory), a victim of battery or other physical harm could petition for a CPO according to the laws of any state.
272. Some states have already initiated this reform. For a discussion of the various permutations of CPO laws and their specific relationship requirements, see Judith A. Smith, Battered
Non-Wives and Unequal Protection-Order Coverage: A Call for Reform, 23 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev.
93, 102–08 (2005).
273. Here, a CPO could be obtained for stalking behaviors outside of the domestic context—for example, against work or former work colleagues or the proverbial obsessed fan—
that would put the alleged stalker on notice and clarify acceptable parameters of future
contact.
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warning.274 The order would provide notice to the defendant so that there
would be no question about what level of contact was or was not permitted
and, if the order were violated, what penalties would attach. Then, if the
protective order were indeed violated, there would be a more serious penalty. This approach would help to ensure that the protective order is taken
seriously while avoiding the premature involvement of the criminal justice
system in situations where such an order would be sufficient to resolve the
issue.275
For example, in the stalking context, to provide notice to defendants,
protective orders could be required in cases that do not involve a credible
threat of imminent harm, and policymakers could impose criminal penalties
for violating the order. Since violating a protective order is a clearly defined
act that is not dependent on the victim’s emotions, this alternative to CIED
statutes would fit within the implicit approach.
Furthermore, given the victim-centered impulses of CIED statutes, the
victim-centered remedy of a protective order may be more effective than
criminal punishment, which may actually exacerbate the situation and raise
the possibility of retaliation.276 Additionally, since a CPO generally provides
for immediate relief through a temporary restraining order, obtaining civil
relief may be a quicker and more effective means of relief.277 There is some

274. There is some evidence that, once the criminal justice system gets involved, violence
worsens and the victim of domestic abuse becomes even more vulnerable when the aggressor
reenters society after being confined. See, e.g., Linda G. Mills, Insult to Injury: Rethinking Our Responses to Intimate Abuse 6 (2003). Furthermore, many sentences for domestic
violence are quite short. Jane K. Stoever, Freedom from Violence: Using the Stages of Change
Model To Realize the Promise of Civil Protection Orders, 72 Ohio St. L.J. 303, 316 (2011). In
comparison, a CPO could be significantly longer without seriously limiting the freedom of the
defendant, and therefore such an order seems more proportional than a prison sentence.
275. Of course, this proposal invites consideration of how widely we are prepared to grant
protective orders and to what extent individuals should be able to insulate themselves from
others who may annoy them but who do not threaten them in any way. Although this Article
does not offer guidelines for determining this question, it flags the issue for future
consideration.
276. Elizabeth Topliffe, Note, Why Civil Protection Orders Are Effective Remedies for Domestic Violence but Mutual Protective Orders Are Not, 67 Ind. L.J. 1039, 1043 (1992).
277. Lowell T. Woods, Anti-Stalker Legislation: A Legislative Attempt to Surmount the Inadequacies of Protective Orders, 27 Ind. L. Rev. 449, 456 (1993). Of course, the ease with which
victims can get CPOs entirely depends on state-specific statutory qualifications and procedural
requirements. For example, in some states, restraining-order legislation may apply only to
spouses or former spouses, while in other states unmarried persons can petition for a CPO. Id.
at 453. Procedural obstacles include filing fees, clerks who discourage petitioners from filing
for a CPO, and an inability in some jurisdictions to obtain temporary restraining orders after
business hours and on weekends. Topliffe, supra note 276. Other concerns include whether
police respond in a timely fashion and whether courts actually dole out punishments when a
CPO is violated. Woods, supra, at 459. Although these impediments compromise the efficacy
of CPOs, they are by no means endemic and can be changed through statutory or administrative reform.
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evidence that domestic violence victims find protective orders helpful both
in reducing violence and as a tool to rearrange an abusive relationship.278
While notice to defendants would address a major concern regarding
CIED statutes, the problem remains that the criminal law would be called to
intervene in situations regarding intimates and peers where no violence is
threatened and the prohibited conduct is unwanted communication. This
reform thus would not alleviate all concerns related to free expression and
the criminal law’s encroachment into the private lives of citizens. It would,
however, represent a serious improvement in shifting the focus of the criminal law toward definable acts and away from attempts to assess victim
emotion.
2. Tracking the Emotional Distress Tort
Policymakers disinclined to eliminate CIED statutes but still intent on
implementing statutory reforms to narrow the potential scope of CIED legislation might consider including an outrageous-conduct requirement,
which echoes the standard for the IIED tort. If criminal statutes required a
similar standard, it would restore the focus of a case to the defendant’s conduct and would avoid the risk of convicting a defendant for nonthreatening,
nonoutrageous behavior that happened to cause a victim emotional distress.279 Yet even adding this requirement would be too subjective to provide
adequate notice to criminal defendants, an issue of particular concern given
that the stakes of a criminal prosecution are far higher than those of tort
regulation.280
While an outrageousness requirement would circumscribe current
CIED statutes and bring the criminal system more in line with its closest
civil counterpart,281 including such a requirement raises concerns (also relevant to tort) about what behaviors should be deemed “outrageous” for purposes of CIED liability. The tort landscape is full of murky fact patterns
278. Julia Henderson Gist et al., Protection Orders and Assault Charges: Do Justice Interventions Reduce Violence Against Women, 15 Am. J. Fam. L. 59 (2001); Jane C. Murphy, Engaging
with the State: The Growing Reliance on Lawyers and Judges to Protect Battered Women, 11 Am.
U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 499, 513 (2003). But CPOs have also come under attack for
ignoring the extent to which “domestic violence is a community problem.” Jane Aiken &
Katherine Goldwasser, The Perils of Empowerment, 20 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 139, 142
(2010) (criticizing the CPO model for relying on individual empowerment of victims instead
of on changing social norms).
279. This would also, in essence, require an objective inquiry into the victim’s emotional
harm, that is, it would require asking whether a reasonable victim would suffer emotional
distress rather than whether this particular victim experienced emotional harm.
280. Cf. Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law 282 (2d ed. 1986)
(explaining that in tort law defendants may be held accountable for conduct different from
that which was “actually risked by his conduct, while this is generally not the [case] in criminal
law” (footnote omitted)); Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules,
Safe Harbors, and Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 Mich. L. Rev.
1030, 1036 (2001).
281. While one could argue that it would be better to level down—that is, to bring the
requirements of emotional distress torts more in line with the criminal law, at the very least—
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involving intimates, former intimates, and others with extensive histories
where determining what constitutes outrageous behavior is extremely difficult.282 Such cases should give pause to policymakers tasked with reforming
criminal statutes, and these cases presage some of the problems that may
arise if CIED statutes were to include an outrageousness requirement.
Some might argue that criminal law should further borrow from tort
law by amending CIED laws to require “severe” emotional distress, a change
that would avoid subjecting defendants to criminal liability based on a lower
level of harm.283 But this reform would still require an inquiry into victim
emotion, which this Article cautions against. The nature of the IIED inquiry
into the degree of impact on the victim is unique,284 and critics suggest that
this inquiry into the victim’s level of emotional distress puts courts in the
difficult position of needing to distinguish between a victim’s severe emotional distress and distress that may be intense but is more temporary.285
If the criminal law were to track the emotional distress tort framework,
the “severe emotional distress” requirement should be (at most) a secondorder inquiry, conducted only after outrageous conduct has been established.286 Although this statutory reform would help to avoid criminalizing
behavior that does not predictably cause emotional distress, it would not
solve the problems inherent in determining what constitutes “outrageous
behavior,” especially in complex interpersonal relationships. Ultimately, it is
better to avoid altogether a case-by-case inquiry into what victim emotions
are reasonable in a particular situation,287 let alone what emotional harm a
particular victim experienced.

it is intuitively odd that the criminal justice system, with its higher stakes for defendants,
should be less protective than its analogue in tort.
282. See, e.g., Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993) (assessing whether sadomasochistic practices could be considered inherently outrageous); see also Halley, supra note
254, at 356.
283. Notably, the NCVC, among other advocates, continues its attempts to broaden criminal liability by reducing the harm requirement. See Model Stalking Code, supra note 139, at
24–25.
284. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. j (1965).
285. Goldberg et al., supra note 52, at 222.
286. Arguably, such statutory reform would prevent the situation in which the defendant’s conduct may have been outrageous, but the victim was not seriously harmed. This
Article maintains, however, that requiring an inquiry into the degree of emotional harm to the
victim is inadvisable. Additionally, some may argue that deterrence goals dictate that we
criminalize antisocial behavior, whether or not there is a victim who suffered harm. Others
may suggest instead that, given the complex interpersonal aspects of most CIED cases, requiring that there be some harm to the victim would represent a sound approach to cabining
liability.
287. For a discussion of problems associated with the “reasonable person” and “reasonable person . . . under the circumstances” inquiries, see Stephen P. Garvey, The Moral Emotions
of the Criminal Law, 22 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 145, 155–57 (2003).
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B. Beyond the Criminal Justice System
Stalking and bullying are important social problems. But not all important social problems are best addressed by the criminal justice system. There
are extensive opportunities beyond the scope of the criminal law for policymakers, educational institutions, and advocacy organizations to work toward
changing behaviors and discouraging behaviors that cause emotional harm.
For example, this Article has already reviewed civil law options suggesting
that, in the context of stalking among adults, CPOs may sometimes provide
the best solution.288
In the juvenile context, there has been a recent explosion of programs
and proposals to address bullying. These proposals include antiaggression
programs,289 which have been tested extensively on elementary-, middle-,
and high-school students; restorative justice approaches, which focus on education rather than on punishment and offer opportunities for mediated
dialogue between the offender and the victim;290 and social-media advocacy
efforts (for example, the “It Gets Better” campaign against antigay bullying).291 While an examination of the effectiveness of these programs is beyond the scope of this Article, there is a growing literature devoted to
describing and evaluating them.292
These and other efforts by educational institutions and advocacy groups
have been instrumental in moving the problem of juvenile bullying into the
foreground. Furthermore, these efforts have experienced significant success
without unnecessarily subjecting juveniles to the criminal justice system.
C.

Preferring the Implicit Approach

A vocal wave of critics suggests that the criminal law (and law in general) does not sufficiently take emotions into account.293 Many of those who
288. See supra Section V.A.1.
289. See, e.g., James Alan Fox et al., Fight Crime: Invest in Kids, Bullying Prevention Is Crime Prevention 12–16 (2003), available at http://www.pluk.org/Pubs/Bullying2.pdf
(describing programs including the Olweus Bullying Prevention Program, The Incredible Years
program, and the Linking the Interests of Families and Teachers program).
290. See, e.g., Susan Hanley Duncan, Restorative Justice and Bullying: A Missing Solution in
the Anti-Bullying Laws, 37 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 267, 281–91 (2011).
291. See, e.g., StopBullying.gov, www.stopbullying.gov/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2014); U.S.
Dep’t of Educ., Department of Education: It Gets Better, YouTube (June 27, 2013), https://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=eU9_6v6i4nE.
292. See, e.g., Kathleen Conn, T.K. and J.C.: Guidance for Schools Dealing with Bullying
and Cyberbullying, 5 Northeastern U. L.J. 77 (2013); Susan M. Swearer Napolitano et al.,
What Can Be Done About School Bullying? Linking Research to Educational Practice, 39 Educ.
Researcher 38, 41–43 (2010); see also Sacco et al., supra note 213; J. David Smith et al.,
Antibullying Programs: A Survey of Evaluation Activities in Public Schools, 33 Stud. Educ.
Evaluation 120 (2007).
293. See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Gender and Emotion in Criminal Law, 28 Harv. J.L. &
Gender 447, 447 (2005); see also Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 Yale L.J. 1087, 1088 (1986); Angela
P. Harris & Marjorie M. Shultz, “A(nother) Critique of Pure Reason”: Toward Civic Virtue in
Legal Education, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1773, 1774 (1993).
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lament law’s marginalization of emotions assume that the only way to integrate emotion into law is to do so explicitly.294 In the criminal-law context,
there have been additional concerns that the law does not sufficiently take
victims into account.295
This Article suggests that, in assessing harm and devising punishment,
(1) the law has always taken emotion into account by using the implicit
approach; and (2) we should continue to work within this system of compromise to police conduct that causes severe emotional harm. A more explicit approach may be appropriate in some areas of law, but the implicit
approach is best for the purpose of defining substantive crimes: it acknowledges the importance of emotional harm, but it does not predicate criminal
liability on the existence of that harm.296
First, though, we must acknowledge that the law makes this compromise—that it already takes emotions into account. Claims that the criminal
law has no interest in emotions ignore the obvious emotional content that
pervades the narratives of crime and punishment. Moreover, to deny the
existence of the implicit approach is to fail to comprehend distinctions
throughout criminal law that punish more seriously those crimes we assume
to cause heightened emotional or psychological harm.297 This does not
mean, however, that the law always does a perfect job calibrating harms and
punishments—indeed, it may be the case that the implicit approach does

294. See, e.g., Clare Huntington, Repairing Family Law, 57 Duke L.J. 1245 (2008);
McAnaney et al., supra note 184, at 890; Posner, supra note 22.
295. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3 Buff.
Crim. L. Rev. 51, 55 (1999). For an articulation of the contrary view that victims should not
play a role in assessing blame or punishment, see Michael Moore, Victims and Retribution: A
Reply to Professor Fletcher, 3 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 65 (1999).
296. What of the argument that CIED statutes are merely a natural extension of victim
impact statements and that the implications of this Article extend even beyond crime definition into criminal procedure? A great deal of literature discusses the merits and demerits of
victim impact statements, and this Article does not purport to cover that ground. But crucial
to this Article is the insight that recent developments in substantive law are fundamentally
different from victim impact statements and have not been the source of sustained scholarly
attention. CIED statutes are distinct from victim impact statements because, rather than provide additional factors to be taken into account in assessing the severity of conduct already
firmly established, such statutes expand the scope of criminal behavior. By contrast, we have
always allowed sentencing judges to take into account an unlimited scope of evidence. Individual circumstances have always been central to sentencing, and rules of evidence do not apply
to the sentencing context. Victim impact statements are therefore one of many “soft factors”
for a judge to consider or ignore, whereas CIED statutes redefine a new set of crimes for which
one can be convicted, thus expanding the scope of what constitutes criminal activity. The
Supreme Court has consistently recognized this distinction as important. See, e.g., Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding that a hate-crime enhancement, which would increase a defendant’s statutory maximum sentence, was an element of the crime rather than a
sentencing factor and, as such, was a fact to be determined by the jury using a reasonable
doubt standard).
297. For a related claim about the law’s treatment of vulnerable victims, see Kleinfeld,
supra note 17.
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not always sufficiently account for emotional harm.298 As awareness of emotional harm increases, so does impatience with the implicit approach for not
doing enough. Yet we should not be too quick to reject this approach even if
it seems to address emotional harm insufficiently in a particular situation.
We should also resist assuming that, to account adequately for emotional harm, we must explicitly criminalize the infliction of emotional distress. While that view is perhaps an outgrowth of the broader impulse to
bring emotions to the forefront in law, it is too extreme. Instead, we should
work within the implicit approach’s system of compromise to identify conduct that causes severe emotional harm and to explicitly prohibit such behaviors. Otherwise, we risk upsetting the precarious balance between
protecting the safety and well-being of citizens and preserving core values
such as free expression and notice to defendants.
Conclusion
The traditional way of addressing victim emotion—through proscribing
conduct categories that are particularly likely to cause emotional distress—is
preferable to predicating criminal liability on another’s emotional harm.
CIED statutes provide a useful lens for examining the role of victim emotion
in criminal law. While these statutes are designed to address real social
problems, the criminal law is an exceedingly blunt tool for shifting social
norms in this context. Ultimately, criminal law can best account for victim
emotion implicitly, by identifying and prohibiting specific conduct that is
assumed to be harmful. Legislators should pay heed to the advantages of this
implicit approach and favor reforms that would circumscribe existing CIED
statutes while opposing measures to further expand the reach of these
statutes.

298. The empirical project of assessing the law’s effectiveness in this regard is beyond the
scope of this Article.
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Appendix:
CIED Statutes
The following chart distills the main features of state CIED statutes.299
First, it indicates whether the intent required by the statute is specific (that
is, the defendant must have intended to harm the victim) or general (that is,
the defendant must have intended to commit the offending act but need not
have intended to cause harm to the victim). Second, the chart indicates the
standard of inquiry required to assess emotional harm: either objective, subjective, or both. An objective inquiry examines whether a reasonable victim
would have experienced emotional harm, while a subjective inquiry looks to
whether this particular victim experienced emotional distress. Finally, the
chart indicates the degree of emotional harm required under the statute.

299. Ala. Code § 13A-6-90.1 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2921
(2009); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-208 (2005); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-602 (2013); Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 53a-183 (2013); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 1311, 1312 (Supp. 2012); D.C. Code § 223133 (LexisNexis 2001); Fla. Stat. § 784.048 (2013); Idaho Code Ann. § 18-7906 (West
2004); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12-7.3 (2012); Iowa Code § 708.7 (2013); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 525.070 (LexisNexis 2008); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:40.2 (Supp. 2014); Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 17-A, § 210-A (West Supp. 2013); Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-802 (LexisNexis
Supp. 2013); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 43 (2010); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 565.090, 565.225
(2014); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-221 (2013); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:33-4 (West 2005); N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 30-3A-2 (2013); N.Y. Penal Law §§ 120.6, 240.25 (McKinney 2014); Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 2903.211 (West 2014); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-59-2 (2002); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-31700 (2006); S.D. Codified Laws § 22-19A-1 (2006); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-308, 39-17315 (2012); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.07 (West 2011); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (LexisNexis 2012); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1062 (2009); W. Va. Code § 61-2-9a (LexisNexis
2010); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-506 (2013).
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State

Intent

Standard

Degree of Harm

Alabama

Specific

Subjective

Material harm to emotional health

Arizona

Specific

Both

Annoyance

Arkansas

Specific

Subjective

Serious annoyance

Colorado

General

Both

Serious emotional distress

Connecticut

Specific

Objective

Annoyance

Specific

Objective

Annoyance

General

Objective

Significant mental anguish or distress

District of Columbia

General

Either

Emotional distress

Florida

General

Subjective

Substantial emotional distress

Idaho

General

Both

Serious annoyance

Illinois

General

Objective

Emotional distress

Delaware

Iowa

Specific

Objective

Annoyance

Kentucky

Specific

Subjective

Serious annoyance

Louisiana

General

Objective

Emotional distress

Maine

General

Objective

Inconvenience or emotional distress

Maryland

Specific

Subjective

Serious annoyance

Massachusetts

General

Both

Substantial emotional distress

Missouri

General

Either

Emotional distress

Montana

Specific

Subjective

Substantial emotional distress

New Jersey

Specific

Objective

Annoyance

New Mexico

Specific

Objective

Substantial emotional distress

Specific

Subjective

Serious annoyance

General

Subjective

Material harm to emotional health

Specific

Subjective

Mental distress

New York
Ohio
Rhode Island

Specific

Objective

Substantial emotional distress

South Carolina

General

Both

Emotional distress

South Dakota

General

Subjective

Annoyance

Tennessee

Specific

Subjective

Annoyance

Texas

Specific

Objective

Annoyance, embarrassment

Utah

General

Objective

Emotional distress

Vermont

General

Objective

Substantial emotional distress

West Virginia

Specific

Subjective

Significant emotional distress

Wyoming

General

Both

Substantial emotional distress

